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ABSTRACT
The Chemging Face of the KGB examines the contemporary 
structure and functions of the post-Soviet Russian security 
emd intelligence services. The nature of the relationships 
of the domestic and foreign intelligence services to other 
power structures in Russia today are exeunined, including an 
evaluation of its espionage networks within Russia, Eastern 
Europe, and the "near abroad." Special attention is devoted 
to an analysis of the Russian foreign intelligence service's 
recruiting methods and the cases of Russian spies Aldrich 
Ames, Harold Nicholson, and Earl Pitts. Finally, the thesis 
excimines the Russian intelligence services' resumption of 
training terrorists, particularly those affiliated with 
Iran.
The purpose of this thesis, then, is to provide an 
understanding of the post-Soviet Russian political-economic 
system and the extent of the Yeltsin Administration's 
progress in instituting democratic reforms, which have been 
thwarted by the continued legacy that is the KGB.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that the KGB has become a household 
term in America and Russia, it is surprising how much 
confusion exists over what it is, how it is orgemized, and 
what it does. The confusion, in many ways, is a logical and 
consistent one in that the organization itself has 
historically undergone rapid and major changes from its 
earliest inception in the hands of "Iron Felix" Dzerzhinsky 
to its present state. The secret police agency has changed 
faces with the changing face of the Russian political 
system. Yet, it was and is a force to be reckoned with.
Known for the terror it produced during the Stalinist 
and Khrushchev eras, the typical Russian today still reacts 
with a symbolic apprehension when the term KGB is used.
Yet, for all these changes there is still a confusion as to 
exactly what the orgzmization was in the past and more so a 
complete lack of understanding and clarity as to what the 
organization consists of and its duties and powers are at 
the present time. Considering the role that Russia is 
playing in international politics today, it is a vital
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2aspect of contemporzury knowledge in political science and in 
criminal justice to have clarity on this issue.
In order to clarify this issue, it is necessary to have 
a historical, political, zmd social understanding of this 
organization and its role in past Russia. For the history 
of Russia has been a simultzmeous history with that of the 
KGB. Indeed, one can make the point that to understand the 
role of the KGB in the changing forces of Russian 
contemporary history is to better understand Soviet-Russ ian 
society today.
When in 1991 Soviet-style communism collapsed 
throughout the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc states of 
Eastern Europe, the geopolitical map of the world changed 
significantly. The immediate consequences of communism's 
demise were the gaining of independence from Moscow of the 
fifteen former Soviet republics. Additionally, the peoples 
of the Eastern European states gained the freedom to change 
their political systems. As many of these countries 
discarded their old communist political systems for 
democratic ones, the role of the secret police and, further, 
its very nature, changed dreunatically. Thus, "democratic" 
changes are much more evident within the former Soviet bloc 
countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltics them in the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) itself.
Structurally, within the new Russian Federation, the 
KGB was broken down into several, smaller entities, which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3were renamed. The governments of the Russian republics 
created "independent" republic RGBs. And new state security 
services were created in the Eastern European states. Neuiy 
changes within the state security and intelligence services 
of the countries within the former Soviet sphere of 
influence took place and reflected the reform process that 
was concurrently occurring within each particular state or 
republic.
Hence, the main emphasis of this thesis will be on the 
current role of the KGB's successor agencies. The study 
will focus on the intelligence services of the Russian 
Federation specifically, but will also examine the state of 
the new security and intelligence agencies of the former 
Soviet republics and the Eastern European countries, where 
KGB surrogate intelligence apparatuses and espionage 
networks had been developed and served as loyal instruments 
under Moscow's control during the Soviet era.
Since the (Russian) secret police retain their primacy 
in Russizm politics, their relationship to contemporary 
Russian society and government is studied. Equally 
important, the continuing work of the contemporary KGB as an 
espionage service is exzuained and evaluated in detail, 
including a discussion of its spy networks. In this respect 
then, this work is historical, political, and social in its 
scope.
Because of the nature of this project, the review of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4the literature in some cases coincided with the review of 
the sources necessary to the study itself. However, as 
every thesis requires as part of its methodological 
procedure a review of the literature, I here make a 
distinction. The purpose of the review was concentrated 
primarily in searching for works that had already dealt with 
the issue being studied. For example, I reviewed any 
sources that have attempted to explain and study the role of 
the KGB historically and contemporarily as it related to the 
history of the Soviet Union zmd contemporary Russia. Once 
again, I emphasize that here my purpose was that of 
examining to what extent the topic had already been 
excimined.
Obviously, since this work is historical, political and 
social in nature, it required an examination of those 
secondary historical, political, and social works concerning 
the birth and development of the KGB. Hence, I searched for 
the history of its development and a political-social 
understanding of its role in Soviet society. Further, 
current works were exeunined; the primary sources that I 
utilized included both American and Russian newspapers, 
periodicals, government documents, conference papers, 
monographs, media broadcasts, and the Internet.
Further, I conducted interviews in the United States 
with Russian nationals that both live in America, and that 
reside in Russia but were visiting the U.S.. I used an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5open-ended guided interview schedule, which allowed more 
information to be made available in the interviews. The 
interviews were then zmalyzed and interpreted in terms of 
the data as it related to the clarification of the problem.
These interviews were necessary since, in light of the 
state of confusion within law enforcement structures in 
Russia today and, moreover, the large gap in the literature 
available today on the current and mere recent state of the 
Russian intelligence services, they provided a more accurate 
picture of the KGB's current role within and its 
relationships to contemporary Russian society and 
government. Further, these interviews provided me insight 
into the internal workings of the past KGB, its operations 
and methods, which shed light and gave clearer meaning to 
its current methods of operations. Furthermore, these 
interviews illuminated the contemporary relationships 
between the Center and periphery security and intelligence 
apparatuses.
Drawing from these primary and secondary sources and 
interviews, in Chapter 2, I present a chronological history 
of the structural changes that the massive KGB underwent 
from the period immediately following the August 1991 coup 
attempt to the present, and which culminated in several new 
security and intelligence agencies, commonly referred to as 
the "KGB's successor agencies." Their names were changed 
numerous times during the early 1990s as their powers
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6increased. Moreover, with each organizational change, 
Yeltsin brought the chekists more firmly under his control.
I emalyze the functional roles of these multiple agencies, 
evaluate the events that led to each structural chzmge, and 
examine the significance of each "new face."
In Chapter 3, I examine the linkages between the major 
pillars of power in Russia today. Indeed, the "new 
oligarchy" that controls contemporary Russia consists of the 
political-elite nomenklatura, orgemized crime elements, zmd 
the KGB. How each of these groups gained power in post- 
Soviet Russia, specifically, the activities and events that 
cemented their relationships and enzUaled them to gain 
control of virtually the entire economic-social strata of 
contemporary Russian society is the focus of this chapter.
In Chapter 4, I exzunine the contemporary role of 
Russia's domestic security and intelligence services. 
Indeed, as communism collapsed, many KGB officers "left" 
government service to start up private security services and 
provide protection to the new banking, business, and 
political elites, many of which maintained ties to organized 
criminals. As such, the integration of organized criminals 
into the major financial structures and government of the 
new Russia was facilitated. Crime and corruption became 
rzunpant. Contract killings reached an unprecedented level. 
These situations are evaluated, including the failure of the 
Russian government to institute any meaningful laws to deal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
with the endemic corruption or to develop a civil society 
based on the rule of law. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the secret police's continued political 
surveillance and, furthermore, its surveillance of Russian 
society.
In Chapter 5, I exzunine the role of the foreign 
intelligence service, the SVR. The nature of Russian 
foreign intelligence changed with communism's demise and the 
subsequent loss of ideological mission. Hence, its changed 
nature is addressed. In Russia's process of transformation 
from a central economy to a "new capitalist" one, Russia's 
foreign intelligence service strived to acquire economic, 
proprietary, industrial, and technical information in order 
to compete in the international business community on a 
global basis.
As markets have become increasingly competitive, the 
Russians have sought to gain market share through the 
benefit of espionage. Hence, the SVR's continuing economic 
espionage offensive is studied in detail. Moreover, the 
collaboration between the "new oligarchy" members to conduct 
espionage for their own personal, commercial interests and 
profits, which is their root source of motivation, is 
examined.
Since Russian organized criminals have developed 
international ties with other "mafia" groups throughout the 
world, sometimes through the manipulation and control of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8Russian emigres, the cooperation between these groups is 
discussed, including an emalysis of the growing threat that 
Russian orgzmized crime, working in close collaboration with 
the Russian security zmd intelligence services, poses to the 
United States, other industrialized countries, zmd the 
international business community.
In Chapter 6, I examine the Russians' use of spies zmd 
their development of espionage networks. Special attention 
is given to the recruitment methods used by the Russian 
intelligence services in the contemporary world. During the 
past few years, numerous discoveries and exposures of spies 
working for Moscow within the rzmks of U.S. intelligence 
agencies and the FBI have illuminated the continued KGB-SVR 
activity in America since the death of the Soviet Union.
The specific cases of Aldrich Ames, Harold Nicholson, and 
Earl Pitts are exzumined.
The loss of ideological mission that coincided with 
communism's demise, coupled with the fact that the Soviet 
bloc states of Eastern Europe gained their independence from 
Moscow, meant that the KGB's networks in these countries 
suffered damage. Moreover, the governments of these newly- 
independent states reorganized their security zmd 
intelligence services in an effort to make them independent 
form Moscow and, consequently, to switch their loyalties 
from Moscow to their own governments and state's national 
security. Hence, I exzunine the current state of security
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9and intelligence services and their espionage networks in 
these states and the barriers that the East Europezm 
governments zmd societies face in their efforts to end the 
repressive techniques of the secret police as they strive to 
change their political-economic systems and "democratize."
Lastly, I exzunine the intelligence situation in the 
"near züsroad," a region that the Yeltsin Administration, and 
Russian foreign intelligence more specifically, rates as a 
top priority. The Russizm Federation's reintegration with 
the Russian republics in order to regain the FSU's influence 
and, further, to partake of and control the wealth of 
resources contained within these former Soviet republics, 
particularly the oil and gas in the Caspian Sea region, is 
first on Yeltsin's foreign policy agenda.
As such, the SVR, in collzüaoration with the FSB, 
Russia's domestic intelligence service, work to manipulate 
and exploit the ethnic tensions in these areas in attempts 
to influence events there by creating the conditions that 
will enzüole them to achieve these objectives. Toward this 
end, Russia's security and intelligence services cultivate 
friendly relationships with foreign intelligence services to 
aid them in these endeavors. Therefore, I examine the KGB's 
successor agencies' efforts to reestzUslish relations with 
the intelligence services of rogue states such as Iran 
through the training of Iranian intelligence agents, and 
even more ominous, the training of terrorists, many of which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
have ties with radical Islamic groups.
In Chapter 7, I conclude by pointing out the great 
threat that the former KGB poses to the international 
business community. Indeed, the "new oligarchy" linkages 
make this threat all the more ominous by the fact that 
Russizm security and intelligence services collzdsorate 
closely with ruthless orgzmized criminals and both the 
chekists and the organized criminals enjoy the backing and 
support of the Russian government. As such, free capitalist 
states must strive to protect their economies from being 
subverted by these forces. And they must take measures to 
ensure the stzibility of their governments, too. Until the 
Russian government reins in its secret police, develops a 
civil society, and institutes a rule of law built upon 
democratic institutions that recognize, protect, and uphold 
the dignity of human life, true democracy in Russia will not 
be realized.
The KGB has undergone multiple nzune changes. They 
entail no more than simple cosmetic changes; the post-Soviet 
Russian KGB continues to retain the szune methods and 
operational tactics of its predecessors. Indeed, since the 
1917 Revolution to 1954 alone, Russia's secret police had 
been labeled at least ten times, beginning with the "VChKa" 
or "Cheka," followed by the "NKVD," the "GPU," the "OGPU," 
the "GUGB," the "NKGB," the "MGB," the "KI," the "MVD," and 
the "KGB." In addition, there has been the "INO," the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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"INÜ," "MOOP," the "KRO," the "GDKR-NKO" or "Smersh," the 
”GRU," "Spetsnaz,” "Osnaz,” zmd others. Indeed, this 
extensive list does not include the numerous new agencies 
that have succeeded the "KGB": the "MSB," "AFB," "KPS," 
"KOGG," "GUO," "MBVD," "MB," "TsSR," "SVR," "FAPSI," "FSK," 
"FSB," "SBP," "FSO," zmd "GSO."
Therefore, to enzüsle the reader to distinguish between 
agencies, I usually refer to the agency by the specific 
title it was known by at a specific moment within the 
context of the time in which the particular event, 
situation, or role I am discussing in each instance that it 
was then known by. For exzunple, if I zim discussing an 
activity of the Russian foreign intelligence service 
immediately following the August 1991 coup attempt, I will 
use the Izüsel of "TsSR. " However, when referring to the 
individual KGB officer(s), or "chekist(s)," (derived from 
"Cheka") as they are commonly Izibeled, whether as a member 
of the KGB, SVR, or the FSB, I typically refer to them as 
such. When I zua referring to the Russian secret police 
organization generally, I either use the term "KGB" or the 
"security and intelligence services." The intention here is 
to enable the reader to more easily grasp the changes that 
occurred within the Russian intelligence services as an 
organization and Russian intelligence officers as 
individuals.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES
Contrary to Russia's claim that following the August 
1991 coup attempt to reinstall hard-liners the KGB was 
dismantled and "disappeared into thin air," the notorious 
secret police and intelligence service continue to exist.
Any chemge in KGB techniques zmd methods have been merely 
cosmetic. Actually, many changes within Soviet-Russia had 
begun tzücing place during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
before communism collapsed. The KGB had played an active 
role in the course of events, culminating in the "putsch" to 
oust Gorbachev in August 1991.
Since 1987, Russian society had gained some freedom of 
expression as a result of Gorbachev's "glasnost" policy.^
The Soviet people did not desire a return to the old 
totalitarian system that the KGB had brutally enforced, as 
demonstrated by the widespread protests in the streets 
during the three days of the putsch. Enjoying their newly- 
gained freedom to spezüc out, the mass public had often 
channeled its hatred and discontent toward Izunbasting the 
KGB for its historically suppressive role. Revelations of
12
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the participation of top KGB leaders in planning, 
organizing, and carrying out the putsch to invoke a state of 
emergency further intensified this focus of public outcry.
Animosity toward the KGB had been particularly severe 
in the Baltic States, where those affiliated with the secret 
police continue to be ostracized from society.^ An 
observzmt member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Azerbaijan, A. Akhmedov, pointedly described the events 
surrounding the Moscow August 1991 coup as "a continuation 
of the bloody events in Baku and Vilnius." Further,
Akhmedov related that those who died in the battles died for 
the szune cause of freedom as those who perished in Moscow 
during the three days of the coup attempt.^
During the late 1980s, the Baltic peoples had attacked 
and seized many KGB offices and headquarters, in the process 
acquiring volumes of secret police files that revealed past 
crimes of the KGB. This action was followed by various 
critics and disaffected KGB staffers presenting the contents 
of these files to the public.
As a result of these raids on KGB offices and the 
public's acquisition of KGB files, many of the terrible 
crimes the secret police had committed were exposed. The 
awakening that the Russian people experienced upon the 
revelation of the contents of these files stunned them as 
they began to realize the injustices they had been subjected 
to and the lies they had been told for many decades by the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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communist regime and its protector the KGB, that great 
"sword and shield of the party," the forces of which had 
maintained total control over their tragic lives. In short, 
widespread opposition and bitter animosity and resentment 
toward the KGB, along with a lack of support from many 
members within the military, security, and intelligence 
institutions, had contributed to the failure of the August 
1991 coup attempt.
In the aftermath of communism's collapse, there was no 
closing of chekist ranks as there had been during the months 
preceding the August 1991 events, when security and 
intelligence officers had united with ultra-nationalists to 
oppose perestroika zmd the signing of the impending Union 
Treaty.^ In fact, there was very little cohesion, 
widespread apprehension and low morale, and, hence, much 
weakness within KGB structures as many officers grappled 
with the exposures of the Soviet secret police's past crimes 
and their future role in the emerging non-totalitarian 
Russian society.
The unraveling events within the Soviet Union had 
damaged the chekists, both in terms of morale and in their 
sense of purpose. Following the failed coup attempt, the 
toppling of Dzerzhinsky's statue in Dzerzhinsky Square was 
televised live. ^ The KGB had not intervened. Since 1985, 
the media had played an increasingly major role in shaping 
political events in Soviet-Russia. As organized crime
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expert Joseph Alb ini pointed out, during the early 1990s, 
the KGB was literally unclear as to what its role was,^ 
particularly since Gorbachev's "glasnost" policy meant a 
major reduction in secret police repression of the 
activities of the Soviet populace. Moreover, the emerging 
free-market economy made capitalism no longer a crime.
Hence, confusion reigned, for clarity on "legal" issues was 
completely lacking. As such, Russian society remained 
marginalized and its citizens open to arbitrary arrest by 
the KGB. And contrary to the chekists' desires, the events 
of August 1991 did not help the state security organization ; 
instead, they weakened it.
Immediately following the August 1991 coup attempt, 
several structural changes occurred within the Soviet 
Union's security and intelligence services. Specifically, 
the massive KGB apparatus, with its numerous directorates, 
departments, and services was broken down into several 
smaller and weaker parts.
Some scholars suggest that Yeltsin's dismantling of the 
powerful intelligence service was spawned by his effort to 
ease the public outcry and widespread antagonism toward the 
KGB, an antagonism that had been growing increasingly 
intense since late (November) 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell 
and Soviet-style communism was collapsing.° Furthermore, 
the public outcry, demonstrated by widespread protests in 
the streets that occurred upon news of the coup leaders'
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attempts to crush the reforms and return the Soviet Union to 
its former old totalitarian state led Yeltsin to recognize 
the political benefits he could reap in the form of public 
support by his "dissolving” the KGB.
Even so, by looking at recent history, one could argue 
that, ultimately, Yeltsin merely restructured the KGB to 
ensure its removal as a threat to his newly-gained power. 
Hence, instead of destroying the notorious secret police 
organization, he maneuvered to bring it under his control. 
Indeed, as Michael McFaul observed, if at any time the 
security services could have been truly dismantled, the 
opportunity had existed then, for both the Soviet Army and 
the KGB were in a state of disarray.^
However, history has shown also that the Russian 
government and secret police have always maintained a 
symbiotic relationship. Indeed, for centuries, Russia's 
political leaders and secret police have been dependent upon 
each other for power and survival. A change in either the 
political or economic system would not alter this trend.
In order to enhance his immediate security, Yeltsin's 
initial move following the putsch was the transfer of the 
RSFSR MVD pariiamentary guard unit into the RF Main Guards 
Directorate (GUO). He gave the unit "autonomous" status. 
This security and protection unit operated under the 
direction of Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Korzhakov,a KGB-veteran 
and Yeltsin's loyal bodyguard since 1986.^^ Being
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responsible for Yeltsin's immediate protection, Korzhakov 
enjoyed daily access to him. As such, he could greatly 
influence the Kremlin decision-making process. Indeed, 
Korzheücov and Yeltsin were almost constantly together. As a 
consequence of this relationship, the power of state 
security forces, particularly those under Korzhadcov's direct 
control, increasingly expanded, as will be shown.
Immediately following the coup attempt, emd under great 
pressure from Yeltsin, Gorbachev issued a decree that called 
for the dismantling of the KGB. He tasked his newly- 
appointed KGB chief, former Interior Minister Vadim Beikatin, 
to carry it out. Hence, Bakatin, whom one year previously 
had called for the KGB's elimination, now^ ^^  ^sought to 
establish legal civil controls^ in an effort to "reform" 
the organization, as was stipulated by the decree.
Bakatin's initiatives, however, were unpopular and 
ultimately unsuccessful,^^ for their aim was to make the 
chekists accountedale for their actions; a noble idea, but 
nonetheless, completely unrealistic, as was soon discovered. 
Although legal controls were not instituted, many structural 
changes did take place.
Under Bakatin's direction, over the period from late 
August 1991 through December 1991, the various directorates, 
departments, and services of the conglomerate KGB were 
divided into six main entities.
The first, the Inter-republic Security Service
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(Mezhrepublikanskaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, or MSB) now 
consisted of the former USSR KGB Second Chief Directorate in 
charge of counterintelligence; the KGB Third Chief 
Directorate which dealt with military counterintelligence; 
was now also responsible for the physical control of nuclear 
weapons; the KGB Fifth Chief Directorate which dealt with 
internal subversion emd dissidents, and which previously had 
been called the Directorate for the Defense of the 
Constitutional System was now renamed "Directorate Z" for 
"zashchita" (or, "defense")),^ ° and the USSR KGB Information 
Analysis Directorate of the former Second Chief Directorate, 
which now produced daily intelligence assessments.
The MSB also was to serve as the coordinating body of 
the Center and the republic KGBs. In effect, domestic «md 
counterintelligence functions were decentralized, with 
direct, day-to-day control being transferred from the Center 
to the newly independent Russian republics, each of which 
had formed their own security and intelligence services 
following communism's collapse.^ As such, the former KGB's 
reach continued to extend throughout the country. The 
powerful Moscow KGB, however, was separate from MSB control 
and, instead, was placed under the control of the Moscow 
city government. Specifically, the Moscow Mayor (Gavriil 
Popov) gained official control of the Moscow KGB.^^ The 
control of the Moscow KGB as of 1997 has been under the 
control of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.
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Hence, the new MSB was responsible for domestic 
intelligence, counterintelligence, the security of nuclear 
weapons, emd intelligence analysis within the entire Russicm 
Federation, except for Moscow. Moreover, the MSB gained 
control of the material resources of the former republic KGB 
directorates; the new republic KGBs were started from 
scratch.
This "decentralization" of the security and 
intelligence forces served to offset the Kremlin's costs of 
controlling the regional and local KGBs, costs the Kremlin 
could ill afford at a time the Soviet-Russian economy was in 
a state of complete collapse. Moreover, calls for 
independence and ethnic separatist uprisings were raging 
throughout most of the republics, which would have required 
great amounts of resources to quell end, hence, would have 
been a major drain on Kremlin resources had Moscow retained 
direct control of the republics' security services. 
Nevertheless, Moscow continued to maintain a great amount of 
political influence over the republic KGBs. This 
maintenance of the status quo was possible because, for the 
most part, the seune chekists remained in their positions 
there; so too, the informer networks remained, although 
direct control over personnel and day-to-day operations were 
transferred to the regional KGB and party leaders.
Naturally, since Bakatin had been appointed by 
Gorbachev to oversee the reorganization of the massive KGB,
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he became chairman of the new MSB, which also made him chief 
coordinator of the many newly-decentralized regional and 
local domestic intelligence services that reached throughout 
the entire Russian Federation.Furthermore, in his 
capacity as MSB chief, Bakatin became chairman of the MSB 
Council, of which the autonomous republicam KGB chiefs, and 
the chiefs of foreign intelligence, communications and 
signals intelligence, emd the Border Troops were also 
members.
The second, the USSR Central Intelligence Service 
(Tsentralnaya Sluzhba Razvedky, or TsSR) , consisted of the 
former KGB First Chief Directorate (FCD) and was responsible 
for foreign intelligence. Further, the new TsSR assumed the 
former KGB Sixth Directorate's functions of economic 
counterintelligence and industrial s e c u r i t y . I t  is 
important to note that in September 1991, the foreign 
intelligence service because an independent entity. The 
TsSR's independence from the other Russian security and 
intelligence services was to ensure the survival of its 
"federal" or "All-Union" status. As Bakatin observed, 
breaking up foreign intelligence or decentralizing its 
control to the republics would have, in effect, virtually 
destroyed it.^® Yevgeniy Primakov, who had strong ties with 
the former KGB,^ became the new head of foreign 
intelligence, replacing Lt. Gen. Leonid Shebarshin, an 
ardent anti-reformist.
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Third, the USSR Government Communications Committee 
(Komitet Pravitel Stvennoye Sviazi, or KPS), consisted of 
the former KGB Eighth Chief Directorate (signals 
intelligence and cryptography), the Sixteenth Directorate 
(technical penetration of foreign missions), the 
Communications Troops, and numerous other directorates, 
departments, academies emd higher schools of communications 
and cryptology.
The KPS was responsible for Russia's entire 
communications network, communications security, 
cryptography, emd signals intelligence. With such vast 
capabilities, the KPS played a major role in active 
measures, dis information, and economic espionage, in 
collaboration with the TsSR (foreign intelligence) . Lt.
Gen. Aleksandr Starovoytov, former deputy head of the former 
KGB Eighth Chief Directorate, became KPS-chief following the 
putsch.^
Fourth, the USSR Committee for the Protection of State 
Borders, (Komitet po-Okhrana Gosudarsvennoye Granitsy, or 
KOGG), consisted of the massive former KGB Border Troops 
Chief Directorate and was responsible for customs and border 
security. Ilya Kalinichenko retained his position as head 
of the Border Troops^° following the August 1991 events.
Fifth, the USSR Main Guard Directorate (Glavnoye 
Upravleniye Okhrany, or GUO), which from August 1991 to 
December 1991 had been called the USSR Protection Service,^
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consisted of the former KGB Ninth Directorate (Executive 
Protection) and the elite KGB Alpha unit, which was 
tremsferred into the Main Guard from the former KGB Seventh 
Directorate (surveillance). The GUO was responsible for the 
protection of top political leaders, the Kremlin, and other 
important political buildings. Vladimir Redkoborodiy beceune 
the new head of the Main Guard Directorate, replacing Lt. 
Gen. Yuri Plekhanov, who had participated in the coup 
attempt.
Sixth, the RSFSR Federal Security Agency (Agentsvo 
Federalnoye Bezopasnosti, or AFB), consisted of the recently 
created (April 1991) Russian Federation KGB (RKGB) which had 
êüssorbed those sections, particularly the
counterintelligence sections (Second Chief Directorate) of 
the USSR KGB that had not been transferred into the 
aforementioned entities in the immediate, post-coup 
reorganization. The AFB itself was created three months 
following the putsch, on November 29 of 1991."
Thus, the RKGB's power and control over resources, 
including a vast and complex network of informers, had been 
greatly expanded. Indeed, the RKGB had gained control of 
state security organs and resources in all the autonomous 
republics, krays, and oblasts that formerly existed within 
the vast territory of Russia in September 1991.^^
Previous to this significant transfer of power, in 
fact, since its inception in April 1991 until the putsch.
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the RKGB had been weak and impotent, while the USSR KGB had 
held real power. Yeltsin had pushed for the creation of 
the RKGB, claiming that all the Russian republics had KGBs 
except for the vast Russian republic. In doing so, Yeltsin 
clearly intended to develop and strengthen his own secret 
police network in an effort to build his growing power base, 
in opposition to Gorbachev's Administration.^® As always, 
Russia's potential leaders endeavored to base their 
political power on their own secret police support.
The new AFB consisted of the former USSR KGB Second 
Chief Directorates that existed within Russian Federation 
borders from St. Petersburg and extending throughout Siberia 
to the Russian Far East. Again, the Moscow KGB had been 
given special status: it was placed under the control of the 
Moscow city council, which was led by Moscow's mayor.
This trend continues today.
The AFB was responsible for combatting organized crime, 
terrorism, drug trafficking, contreü3and, and corruption.
Such tasks reflected the state of affairs within Soviet- 
Russian borders in the post-cold war world. The political- 
economic situation was one of fundamental lawlessness as the 
battle for state resources raged throughout the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU). Nevertheless, in what was a smooth 
transition, RKGB Chairman Ivanenko became head of the AFB.^® 
However, the organization survived for only three weeks 
before the other chekist agencies eüssorbed it in the next
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restructuring, thereby eliminating reformist-minded 
Ivanenko's position and, in effect, ousting him.^
The dismantling of the KGB applied only to state 
security and intelligence forces. In other words, the 
regular militia forces (regular police), which included the 
USSR MVD and the RF MVD, remained unaffected by these 
reorganizations and, therefore, maintained their structures, 
at least for a brief period of time.
This reorganization of the Soviet-Russiem security and 
intelligence services had been accomplished cUsruptly, and 
would be followed by the seuae pattern as political intrigues 
and needs to alter the security services' image developed. 
Indeed, the entire country had been in a state of convulsion 
as Soviet institutions crumbled in the fallout of German 
reunification and the collapse of communism within the 
former Soviet bloc states. The political climate had 
required that the security and intelligence services be 
rearranged, however temporary the changes would be.
Indeed, just three weeks after the AFB had been 
created, on December 19, 1991, in a major power grab, 
interim Interior Minister Viktor Barannikov persuaded 
Yeltsin to sign a decree that merged the MSB and the USSR 
MVD into one organization, and merged the RF AFB and the RF 
MVD into one organization, emd then combined these two new 
and larger entities to form one massive Ministry of Security 
and Interior Affairs (Ministerstvo Bezopasnosti i
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Vnutrennykh Del, or MBVD)
The date of the decree creating the new security and 
intelligence service is notable: December 20, 1991 marked 
the 74th emniversary of the creation of the Cheka. Indeed, 
to this day, state security officers are paid on the 20th 
day of each month to commemorate that special and symbolic 
day.'*^  Many scholars agree that, contrary to the essence of 
the chekists' "new image," any genuine break with the past 
was nonexistent.
Naturally, Barannikov became the chairman of the 
unified and, hence, more powerful security and intelligence 
service, negating the necessity of Bakatin's position, which 
was conveniently eliminated (just as Ivanenko's position had 
abruptly ended). Either way, Bakatin's days heading the KGB 
successor agency were numbered; many chekists viewed his 
transfer of the KGB's blueprints of the installation of 
listening devices in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to U.S. 
Ambassador Robert S. Strauss as a treasonous act;*^ 
consequently, Bakatin's ouster was ineviteüale.
As a result of this new merger of security and police 
forces, the USSR and RF MVDs were combined and placed under 
MVD-veteran Viktor Yerin's direction. So, too, the chekist 
organizations, the MSB and AFB, were ultimately placed under 
MVD control through the high command of MBVD chief (and MVD- 
veteran) Barannikov. Hence, the MVD was officially in 
control of state security. This arrangement would prove
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unworkeüsle, as will be discussed.
Concurrent with these changes within the domestic 
security emd intelligence services, the TsSR (foreign 
intelligence) was brought under Russian control emd, to 
reflect this chemge, was reneuned the External Intelligence 
Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, or SVR). Within the 
context of the setting of legal norms or recognition of any 
rule of law, like the domestic KGB successor agencies, no 
real changes either in methods or personnel took place 
within the foreign intelligence service. Instead, only an 
appearance of efforts to change its image were attempted.
For example, contrary to official SVR statements that 
"active measures" had ceased, the former CPSU International 
Department (ID), which handled this sphere, was simply 
absorbed into the new SVR.**
Other changes within Russian intelligence structures 
also occurred. Eight days later, on December 28, 1991, the 
KPS (comint, sigint) was renamed the Federal Agency for 
Government Communications and Information (Federalnoye 
Agentsvo Pravitel Stvennoye Sviazi, or FAPSI). Furthermore, 
the KOGG (Border Protection) was renamed the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) Border Troops.*®
The heads of the SVR (foreign intelligence), FAPSI 
(signals and communications intelligence), and the Border 
Troops (border protection) remained the same. However, the 
GUO (Main Guard Directorate) received a new chief, Lt. Gen.
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Mikhail Barsukov, who answered directly to Yeltsin.*®
Indeed, each reorganization brought the secret police more 
solidly under Yeltsin's direct control. Moreover, each 
restructuring had resulted in increases in the chekists' 
powers, which they had been regaining ever since they had 
reached their nadir following the putsch.
Barannikov's massive MBVD, with its blending of 
chekists with MVD forces, was reminiscent of the nefarious 
former Security Minister Beria's 1934 reorganization that 
had entailed a similar combining of security and 
intelligence forces with the regular police that had made 
him immensely powerful, and which had culminated in the 
creation of the notoriously brutal NKVD. However, as J. 
Michael Waller noted, the intense and ubiquitous opposition 
by the former KGB officers of being relegated to "equal" 
status with the militia forces*^ led to yet another 
reorganization less than one month later.
On January 16, 1992, Yeltsin signed a decree that 
separated from the MBVD the state security and regular 
police forces. In other words, the MBVD was dissolved and a 
new state security organization was established. The 
chekists were transferred into a newly-created Ministry of 
Security (Minsterstvo Bezopasnosti, or MB) , while the 
regular police forces (the two newly-combined MVD 
organizations) now formed a much larger MVD, remaining under 
Yerin's control.*® Yeltsin placed the new MB under
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Barannikov's control. Like Beücatin's, AFB-head Ivemenko's 
position was conveniently negated by this reorganization and 
he was ousted. It is important to note that both Bakatin 
and Ivanenko had been reformist-minded.Indeed,
Barannikov took this opportunity to replace meuiy reformist- 
minded officers in the state security remks with hard­
liners.®®
The newly-created MB consisted of the entire former KGB 
Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence), the Third 
Chief Directorate (military counterintelligence), the Chief 
Directorate for Combatting Contraband and Corruption, the 
Internal Security Directorate, the Sixth Directorate 
(economic and industrial security), emd the Directorate for 
Combatting Terrorism, whose title was merely the cover for 
the same old former Fifth Chief Directorate (dissidents, 
ethnics, nationalists) that had supposedly been "truly 
abolished" during the Gorbachev era." After all, state 
security then considered and continues to laibel political 
dissidents as criminals and terrorists.
Essentially, the new state security organization was 
responsible for the KGB's traditional functions of 
maintaining internal security and suppressing political 
opposition. Indeed, political surveillance was conducted on 
an ever greater scale as Yeltsin sought to more firmly 
secure his grasp on power. ®^
Six months after the MB's creation, in June 1992, the
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Border Troops lost the autonomy they had enjoyed since the 
putsch and were placed again under state security control. 
The complex situation on the Russian Federation's borders 
made this subordination inevitable. Barannikov persuaded 
Yeltsin to replace Kalinichenko with Lt. Gen. Vladimir 
Shlyaüchtin®® as head of border security.
To bolster his security against the growing strength of 
his political rivals, in mid-1993, Yeltsin created the 
Presidential Security Service (Sluzhba Bezopasnosti 
Presidents, or SBP).®* This new entity consisted of the 
newly-autonomous parlieunentary guards unit, and was under 
KGB-veteran Aleksandr Korzhêücov's direction. Yeltsin had 
removed the unit from the control of the Main Guard 
Directorate (GUO) , and made it answereüsle directly to him. 
Consequently, Korzhakov's political power and influence 
greatly increased for he enjoyed direct access to Yeltsin on 
a day-to-day basis and, hence, was able to keep a constant 
pulse on Kremlin affairs emd policy.
The SBP's responsibilities included the direct 
protection of the Russian president. Basically, the unit 
operated as Yeltsin's own personal security service. Since 
gaining its autonomy, the presidential security unit's power 
continually increased as it grew from strictly a guard 
service, to next gaining basic intelligence and 
counterintelligence functions, to then becoming one 
encompassing many aspects of the former KGB's work. Indeed,
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this orgemization constituted Yeltsin's own fiefdom.
To conceal the covert intelligence and spying functions 
of the new SBP, its regulation was kept a secret. In fact, 
it was not until April 1996, a period of over two-and-a-half
years since the orgemization' s creation, that the
"Regulation of the RF Presidential Security Service" was 
officially confirmed by a Yeltsin decree.®®
According to the secret regulation, SBP functions
included "revealing, warning and putting a stop to any
unlawful actions at places outlined by the President." This 
wording is quite undefined and eunbiguous and, in short, ceui 
be interpreted as including the wide-ranging tasks of 
intelligence, counterintelligence, and, most notably, 
political surveillance. Thus, in essence, the SBP was 
granted the authority, in fact, was mandated, to maintain, 
among others, constemt and close surveillance of Yeltsin's 
political opposition forces. As such, the SBP's reach could 
extend indefinitely. Moreover, the regulation's design 
provided Korzhakov's unit a license to engage in all manner 
of political intrigue. Hence, it was indeed appropriate 
when a Moscow News writer leüaeled Korzhakov the "Shadow 
Minister".®® The IcUdel has stuck.
As the conflicts between Yeltsin and his reformers and 
hard-liners in the parlieunent grew more intense, Yeltsin was 
forced to rely increasingly on his state security forces to 
support him and keep him in power. However, the state
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security chief, Barannikov, was providing Yeltsin's 
political opposition with evidence of corruption within 
Yeltsin's government.®^ Hence, in July 1993, near the time 
when Yeltsin had created the SBP, Yeltsin dismissed 
Baremnikov from his post as head of the MB. Soon 
thereafter, ironically, the former MB chief was himself 
charged with corruption. Yeltsin's (former) KGB forces were 
obviously at work here.
In addition to the fact that Barannikov cooperated with 
Yeltsin's political opposition, his dismissal was also 
likely a consequence of his corresponding failure to 
demonstrate sufficient support to Yeltsin vis-a-vis the 
escalating rift between the hard-liners and Yeltsin's 
Administration.®® Hence, on July 28, 1993, Lt. Gen. Nikolay 
Golushko, who had served both as former chief of the former 
KGB Fifth Chief Directorate and former chairman of the 
Ukrainian KGB, replaced Barannikov®® as MB-head.
Furthermore, Barannikov's Border Troops appointee, Lt. Gen. 
Vladimir Shylyakhtin, was replaced by army officer Col. Gen. 
Andrey Nikolaev.®® Both dismissals were effected under the 
pretext of the failure of the MB and its subordinate Border 
Troops to quell unrest at the Taj ik-Afghanistan border, in 
addition to the "violation of ethical norms."®^
The KGB regularly found evidence of corruption by 
government officials once their positions within Yeltsin's 
Administration were lost. Yeltsin's divide-and-rule policy.
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which he relentlessly practiced toward his political 
appointees, made for an unstable but, nonetheless, highly- 
desired career choice process among Russia's elite. The 
desire for political power, however temporary, ensured a 
constemt stream of aspiring (party) hacks.
Shortly after Yeltsin's (September 21, 1993) 
announcement that he was dissolving the parliament, in 
October 1993, the hard-liners in parlieunent took control of 
the Russiem Supreme Soviet building. Even though the 
security services under Golushko's control had provided 
Yeltsin only lukewarm support during the bloody 
confrontation, the rebellion was crushed by Yeltsin's 
forces. The perpetrators, specifically Yeltsin's main 
political rivals, former Russian Vice President Aleksandr 
Rutskoi and ex-Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, 
were arrested and imprisoned, only to be granted amnesty in 
February 1994 by a parlieunentary resolution of the new, 
hard-1 ine-dominated Duma.
Following the October crisis and in recognition of the 
need for a stronger state security organization that he 
could rely on to provide him greater support in his fight 
against political adversaries, Yeltsin moved to reinforce 
the ranks. In addition to the recent events within Kremlin 
political circles, the communists' win in the December 1993 
parlieunentary elections provided Yeltsin a clear signal that 
he was losing his grip on power. Moreover, as Boris
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Pustintsev observed, Yeltsin had received false information 
eü3out the state of Russian public opinion from his 
intelligence services and, hence, had been caught by 
surprise when the communists won by great margins in that 
December 1993 parlieunentary elections; this realization, 
made changes in the secret police, particularly in the wake 
of the October crisis, imperative.
Hence, Yeltsin determined that another reorganization 
of the Russian security and intelligence forces was 
mandatory. Therefore, in an effort to negate his political 
weaknesses and to fortify his ranks against the communists' 
growing influence, on December 21, 1993 Yeltsin again 
reorganized the state security services. The MB was 
"dissolved," declared "unreformzdale",®* and renamed the 
Federal Counterintelligence Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba 
Kontrarazvedki, or FSK).
In line with the Russian government's practice of 
always seeking to shape a positive image for its chekist 
organizations, the new state security apparatus was 
relegated from "ministry" to "service" status to give the 
appearance that the chekists' powers were being weakened. 
Even so, in an overt contradiction to this "new image," 
former "dissident-hunter"®® Golushko continued to head the 
renamed orgauiization, and kept his ministerial status, 
which, one could reason, was to help ensure that the 
transition from the MB to the FSK was relatively stable.
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Golushko's chairmamship was short-lived, however, for as 
some researchers speculate, Yeltsin soon removed him because 
of his insufficient provision of support during the October 
crisis®® and the subsequent release of Yeltsin's political 
enemies from prison.®^ News reports indicated that Golushko 
"was ousted for failing to block the release of the hard­
liners".®® Again, it was success in defeating Yeltsin's 
political enemies that seemed to ensure no loss of position 
at the helm of Russian security and intelligence forces.
Yeltsin appointed Sergei Stepashin (who had headed the 
Stepashin Commission that was formed in 1991 to investigate 
the security and intelligence service in the wake of the 
August 1991 coup attempt) , to head the new FSK, a position 
he had actually been marked for since December, but which 
Golushko had held for the past three months, again, most 
likely to provide for some continuity while the security 
forces underwent great change.®®
Soon after renzuming the state security apparatus the 
FSK, (in January 1994), Yeltsin removed the Border Troops 
from state security control and renzuned the organization the 
Federal Border Service (Federalnaya Pogranichnaya Sluzhba). 
Moreover, in an effort to further enhance his tight control 
over the newly-reorganized security forces, Yeltsin made the 
Border Troops subordinate directly to him, ® zmd kept 
Nikolayev as their chief.
The statute of the new FSK made the domestic security
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and intelligence organization responsible directly to 
Y e l t s i n . T h e  FSK was responsible for counterintelligence; 
at least, the FSK's main stated function was 
counterintelligence. During 1994 interviews with two 
reliable zmd knowledgeable informzmts, the author incpiired 
as to the main function of the contemporary KGB; both 
responded that it was counterintelligence. They then 
continued, describing the main activities of the former KGB 
as being different now than before communism's collapse. 
Since communism's demise, they said, domestic political 
surveillance was a major KGB activity for now "there is not 
just one political party, but many" that need to be 
monitored/"
What the informants revealed was that the domestic 
intelligence service's main function was 
counterintelligence, but then they described the main 
activities as much more - - close political surveillance of 
numerous political parties, in addition to other tasks, such 
as counterintelligence.
By the Russian authorities' official claim that the 
FSK's main function is counterintel 1 igence, they, in effect, 
may be attempting to alter the perception of the FSK from 
one that views the apparatus as conducting domestic spying 
operations of Yeltsin's political opposition on a massive 
scale to one meant to intimidate foreigners, since 
counterintelligence equals the thwarting of hostile FIS
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activities. This response provides a very different picture 
of what the Russian intelligence services' activities are, 
which pointedly conflict with the "democratic" image it has 
sought to project. *®
In further confirmation, other scholars have found that 
Stepashin, in his position as FSK-head, actively promoted 
the continuation of political surveillance on the domestic 
front. ® Indeed, with the monumental growth in the number 
of political parties in Russia by 1994, the FSK greatly 
escalated its political investigation activities and 
domestic spying operations.
As an informant confirmed during a 1995 interview with 
the author, the current situation in Russia, then, required 
that numerous political parties be monitored by the former 
KGB." Since 1987, and more specifically, in post-communist 
Russia, many different political parties had emerged. As 
such, the KGB's successors spied on those parties that 
opposed their own particular master.® For example, the 
Moscow KGB, which was under the control of the Moscow mayor, 
spied on the Yeltsin Administration and Yeltsin's security 
services, and vice-versa. Inevitably, this led to clashes 
between chekists.
Moreover, the situation became one where the dominant 
political parties were also kept under surveillance by 
"privatized" KGB officers, who were working for commercial 
interests. Loyalties zunong former KGB officers shifted from
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the Soviet state to the particular master they happened to 
serve at the time, be it a private businessman or a public 
figure. "Reform" of the secret police was not on the 
agenda. Rather, as Amy Knight observed, to deal with the 
course of domestic chekistry, Yeltsin preserved and, 
further, increased the powers of the state security and 
intelligence services under his control to fight his 
political opposition.’®
The FSK's statute made the organization responsible for 
counterintelligence, fighting terrorism, drug and weapons 
trafficking, ethnic separatism, organized crime, and 
economic counterintelligence.®® Since the FSK was working 
within a free-market economy, Stepashin argued that the role 
of the state security apparatus in monitoring business 
enterprises was crucial in order for the chekists to 
maintain control over the economic well-being of the 
country.®’ In reality, the chekists applied economic 
intelligence and counter intel 1 igence tactics (backed up by 
their increased investigative powers) to force out honest 
business and take over, in cooperation with government 
officials and organized criminals, successful and 
potentially successful private businesses in Russia. These 
activities will be examined in detail in later chapters.
Moreover, the old campaign of vigilance against foreign
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spies* gained momentum in 1994, as reflected in the Russian 
media emd at security conferences.®^ The FSK's statute, 
then, incorporated immense powers to the chekists. As Amy 
Knight pointed out, by the end of 1994, the state security 
apparatus had finally become more powerful them its 
communist predecessor, the formideüale former KGB.®’
The conflict in Chechnya that erupted in December 1994 
resulted in large-scale FSK operations to undermine and 
overthrow the Dudayev-led rebel government there.®* Former 
KGB Gen. Oleg Kalugin observed that Yeltsin's handling of 
the conflict in Chechnya signaled the increasing influence 
of the security forces.®® It was a priority of the FSK to 
gather intelligence in the "recalcitrant" republic with the 
aim of crushing the rebel movement. As the fighting and 
loss of life escalated, reports surfaced indicating that 
SBP-head Korzhakov had prevented military intelligence 
assessments recommending no intervention in Chechnya from 
reaching Yeltsin®®. However, Amy Knight pointed out that 
this "unlikely claim" concerned GRÜ intelligence reports,®’ 
not FSK assessments, which supports the view that the 
Russian government's losing battle in Chechnya was primarily 
an FSK operational failure, and, as such, one could infer 
that Stepashin's FSK was to blame. The FSK's attempts to
Stephashin had warned of the greatly increased threat posed 
by foreign spies at an April 1994, 3-day conference on 
"Security of the Individual, Society, State and Russiem 
Special Services."
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subvert the Dudayev government had repeatedly failed. 
Moreover, the demoralized Russiem military, which had been 
sent to the republic to crush the rebellion in December 
1994, was constantly humiliated by the rebels.
Amy Knight has commented that the military blamed its 
losses on faulty intelligence provided by the FSK. However, 
she observed, it was highly unlikely that the 6RU was not 
collecting its own intelligence on the Chechnya situation.®® 
Ultimately, not only did no one want to take the blame for 
the inability of the Russian government forces to end the 
crisis, but Stepashin (and his FSK) was caught up in a 
political struggle against Korzhakov emd his corrupt 
military intelligence associates;®® those who were involved 
in many lucrative arms deals,®® and, further, who were, it 
was speculated, profiting from their engagement in trade 
with organized criminals in the Chechen republic (and the 
"near eüaroad") and who were aided in their commercial 
pursuits by exploiting the war, to FSK-head Stepashin's 
disadvantage. ®’
In June 1995, in the immediate wake of the rebels' 
seizure of hostages at Budennovsk,®^ and, as the end result 
of FSK-chief Stepashin's bungling of multiple operations 
against the Chechens, Stepashin was dismissed.®® Korzhakov 
and his men had won the political battle.
In light of this crisis situation for state security, 
in April 1995, a new law was passed that still more greatly
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broadened state security's powers.®* To reflect the changes 
to state security implicit in this law, the state security 
organization was renamed; it would be called the Federal 
Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, or FSB). 
Like the other Russian security and intelligence agencies' 
statutes, the FSB statute made the organization responsible 
directly to Yeltsin.®®
The "Law on Organs of the Federal Security Service" 
fully restored the agency's investigative powers and its 
control over prisons emd special troop detachments, which 
powers had been lost in the immediate aftermath of the 
putsch. Part of this change included state security's 
regaining full control of its "prisons and investigative" 
departments,®® thus, further increasing the chekists' power. 
Further, the FSB gained communications security (comsec) 
functions.®’ More importamtly, the law expanded FSB 
authority beyond Russia's borders; an implication being that 
the new law could be interpreted as providing for an overlap 
of jurisdiction with other chekist agencies, particularly 
the SVR (foreign intelligence).
Even so, it is notable that this expansion of FSB 
powers beyond Russia's borders most likely referred to the 
geographic areas of the "near cibroad," which were understood 
to be those republics surrounding Russia's immediate borders 
rather than classic foreign states, which remained solely 
within SVR jurisdiction. As Amy Knight pointed out, the
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April 1995 lav explicitly authorized the FSB to "establish 
formal relationships" with the security and intelligence 
services of the "near abroad" in an effort to coordinate 
state security activities and to cooperate on intelligence 
matters.
By 1996, the Russian intelligence services had signed 
extradition agreements with many of the republics' 
intelligence services, and cooperation in capturing and 
extraditing targeted "terrorists" (dissidents) had 
occurred.®® The Kremlin's efforts to close formal 
intelligence agreements with the various republic KGBs 
demonstrated the overt intention of the Russian government 
to reintegrate the Russian Federation with the "near 
abroad," in antagonism to the institution of any legal, 
procedural guarantees and the building and development of 
democratic institutions.
Soon thereafter, Yeltsin moved Barsukov from his 
position as head of the GUO (Main Guard Directorate) to 
replace Stepashin as FSB chief. Barsukov's new appointment 
was accompanied by the transfer of the Alpha unit from the 
GUO to the FSB.’°° In other words, Barsukov brought his 
elite forces with him (to the FSB) . One week later, in what 
had become a complete reversal of control, Yeltsin placed 
the GUO under the jurisdiction of the SBP. In the process, 
the GUO was made responsible directly to the President.’®’ 
Barsukov's former deputy, Yuri Kravipin, beceune the new GUO-
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head. In effect, Barsukov and Korzhakov together, now 
controlled state security, and, thus, had become immensely 
powerful.
As Amy Knight observed, the name change was significemt 
because it replaced "counterintelligence” with "security," 
and thus reflected the expanded powers and duties of the 
state security apparatus. In fact, the new name more 
accurately described the all -encompass ing role the state 
security service played on Russia's domestic front.
The June 16, 1996 presidential elections brought 
further significant changes to state security and 
intelligence structures. Yeltsin's intense struggle against 
both ultra-nationalist Gennady Zyuganov, who enjoyed 
communist party support, and nationalist army general 
Aleksandr Lebed, who also enjoyed widespread support, forced 
him to employ his security forces against his political 
opposition in order to impede their goals of attaining 
political power and, more importantly, to retain his own 
grip on power. Barsukov and Korzhakov played a key role in 
the competition; indeed, Yeltsin's security forces needed no 
prodding.
Since Russian politics operates on the patron-client 
model, Korzhakov and Barsukov both had a high stake in the 
election's o u t c o m e . B o t h  employed a wealth of resources, 
including those in the form of currency that they had reüced 
off the profits of many of their corrupt cronies' business
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enterprises, particularly those involved in arms êuid oil 
d e a l s , i n  an effort to ensure a Yeltsin win. In spite of 
their efforts, 13 days before the run-off election, Yeltsin 
fired both Barsukov emd Korzhakov, along with First Deputy 
Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, in yet another power play and 
political power struggle.
What role, if any, that newly-appointed National 
Security Advisor Aleksandr Lebed, Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, or Presidential Chief-of-Staff Anatoli Chubais 
played in the events surrounding Yeltsin's removal of his 
top aides is purely speculative. Intrigue surrounded the 
arrest by Korzhakov's and Barsukov's men of two of Chubais' 
campaign aides who were taking $500,000 out of the White 
House just days before the run-off election.Korzhakov's 
and Barsukov's men had interrogated the campaign workers for 
eleven hours before releasing them.
One explanation is that Yeltsin purged his close 
advisors to accommodate the democratic candidate Grigori 
Yavlinsky and the liberals associated with the liberal 
economist and presidential chief-of-staff Anatoly Chubais.
It is possible that Chubais pressured Yeltsin to oust them; 
indeed, Chubais and Korzhakov had long been enemies.
Another explanation is that Yeltsin sacrificed his 
long-term, loyal security men to appease the millions of 
communist party-supporting pensioners who viewed Barsukov, 
Korzhakov, and Soskovets as deeply corrupt officials.
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Actually, Yeltsin's political maneuvering may well have been 
accomplished in an effort to sway this significant (by its 
large numbers) sector of voters in the upcoming (July 1996) 
run-off election by presenting a picture of coming economic 
reform, a clampdown on official corruption, emd meaningful 
government consideration of their worsening finemcial 
plight.
Whatever the reason, the natural result of Yeltsin's 
ousting of Barsukov and Korzhaücov resulted in yet another 
structural change of Russian state security forces.
Yeltsin named veteran chekist Nikolai Kovalev, 
(Barsukov's top deputy) as acting chief of the FSB.^ °® 
Furthermore, the SBP, which had become immensely powerful 
while under Korzhakov's control, was folded back into the 
GUO (Main Guard Directorate) from which it had been removed 
in 1991.
Yeltsin appointed Lt. Gen. Yuri Kravipin as the new 
head of the GUO, and further, gave him the additional task 
of heading the federal bodyguard service, replacing 
Korzhakov as Yeltsin's personal bodyguard. Soon thereafter, 
however, Lt. Col. Anatoli Kuznetsov, who had been trained by 
the KGB's Ninth Chief Directorate, and was reportedly 
handpicked by Korzhakov, was confirmed as Yeltsin's personal 
bodyguard.
Without Korzhakov's leadership, the SBP lost a 
substantial eunount of political clout. The Los Angeles
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Times reported that Korzhakov had commanded 10,000 men as 
SBP-head, and moreover, by way of his influence over 600- 
head Barsukov, had enjoyed de facto control over 15,000 
(GUO) t r o o p s . T h e  Moscow News, however, issued a report 
that the change in leadership was unlikely to affect the 
organization's performance.Inevitably, new GUO-head 
Kravipin ultimately ceune to wield less influence on 
Yeltsin's policies than Korzhakov had.
Further, the new reorganization entailed the creation 
of a new (newly-reneuned) state security organization. On 
June 20, 1996, Yeltsin signed a decree reneuning the GUO the 
Federal Protection Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrany, or 
FSO).^^^ Yeltsin placed Kravipin at its head in a smooth 
transition."^ Additionally, Yeltsin appointed new FSO-chief 
Kravipin to also serve as the acting chief of the SBP.^ ^^
Days later, on July 2, 1996, Yeltsin signed a decree 
that merged the new FSO with the SBP. The new agency was 
called the State Protection Service (GSO). In another 
smooth transition, Yeltsin appointed FSO-head Kravipin to 
head the new GSO (State Protection Service)."^
Therefore, as of late 1996, six major security and 
intelligence organizations, including the regular police, 
were in existence in Russia. These included: 1) the SVR; 2) 
FAPSI; 3) the FSB; 4) the GSO; 5) the Federal Border 
Service ; and, 6) the MVD.
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The demise of the Soviet Union and the introduction of 
a free-market economy augered many changes in the operations 
of Russia's security and intelligence agencies.
Furthermore, the multiple name emd structural changes that 
occurred within the domestic security and intelligence 
services had led to much confusion, frustration, and 
aggravation among chekists, which invariably affected the 
Russian foreign intelligence service, also. And as is the 
case with all sovereign states, the situation on the 
domestic front was inherently linked with foreign events.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE NEW OLIGARCHY
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, phenomenal 
changes were taking place within Soviet-Russian economic 
structures. This period marked the beginning of the 
trams it ion from a command to a market economy. Kremlin 
leaders, in colladaoration with the KGB, had struggled to 
keep reforms in check but the situation had spiraled out of 
control.^  Consequently, there was a major shift in the 
political power structures as opportunities and weaknesses 
within Moscow and the regional governments were exploited by 
corrupt officials and organized criminals.
From the instituting of communism in 1917 until 1989 
when Gorbachev's reforms began to take hold, the Soviet 
Union had been ruled by an oligarchy consisting of the CCCP 
SU, the Soviet military, and the KGB. These were the so- 
called "power ministries" that held Soviet social-political- 
economic structures and institutions together for over 70 
repressive years by exercising total control. But as 
communism's collapse loomed imminent, a new oligarchy was 
taking shape and organizing its future stronghold on power
53
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in Russia.
This new oligarchy consisted of the political elite- 
nomenklatura, which replaced the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CCCP SU), organized 
crime (OC) elements, which filled the void left by the 
debilitated Soviet military, and the omnipresent KGB. As 
such, since 1991, Yeltsin and his reformers, along with many 
old party bosses, have constituted Russia's political elite. 
Increasingly, the conservative leadership of Russia has been 
influenced by the young, new entrepreneurs; mainly,
Russia's "new rich". While reformist-minded people 
comprised much of Yeltsin's Administration, the regional and 
local governments continued to be directed and controlled by 
old-line party apparatchiks. Many old communist party 
bureaucrats also remained within the Moscow city government 
structures.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize a major 
distinction between Moscow and the periphery. Moscow has 
become a city alive with capitalist frenzy while the 
numerous oblasts and krays within the vast territory of 
Russia remain unmodemized and in their previous Soviet 
state - - minus the money and benefits that the central 
government used to supply in order to prop up these areas.^ 
Hence, from an intelligence point-of-view, the distinction 
is sharp in that chekists in the periphery continue to 
operate as they always have toward the peoples of Russia's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
outer regions; the secret police system, with all its 
abuses, remains the same. Within these localities, the 
chekists, along with the old communist party hacks, retain 
firm control.
By 1989, the Soviet military was weak from the Afghem 
War, suffering from low morale, plagued by widespread 
corruption, and in great disarray.^ As a result, it had 
lost considerable influence over events within the Soviet 
Union's traditional sphere of influence. And despite the 
fact that the Russian republics had quickly gained 
independence from Moscow, the military nonetheless lost its 
influential power within the former Soviet Union and, 
further, the new Russiem Federation itself. Its place 
within the old oligarchy was replaced by others, 
specifically, by organized criminals, as will be discussed.
The third component of the old oligarchy, the KGB, for 
the most part emerged unscathed from communism's collapse 
and the phenomenal changes that took place from 1989-1991 
and, hence, retained its position within the (new) 
oligarchy.^ During this period, the intelligence service 
was quite active, as will be shown. Thus, the power vacuum 
created by a weak and corruption-plagued Soviet military, 
coupled with a transforming economy that lacked any 
significant banking, business, contract, or tax laws, 
enéibled OC elements to gain great influence and, hence, fill 
this power vacuum.
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Russia's changed political situation was shaped by key 
events that followed the crumbling of communism. When the 
Soviet Union's communist party-controlled government 
collapsed, the ensuing power struggles shifted control to 
orgemized criminals. This "transfer" of control was 
accomplished at the behest of the top Kremlin leaders 
through their utilization of the KGB. The KGB had been 
vigilantly monitoring the course of events for the party, 
and was acutely aware of the situation. The KGB had 
remained a formidable force throughout the tumultuous 
changes in Russia because of its widespread participation in 
stimulating them.
Throughout the events of this critical period, the 
secret police continued to serve as the Soviet-Russian 
leaders' bulwark against opposition forces; however, at a 
cost. Therefore, how these "new oligarchy" linkages 
developed and were consummated requires analysis before any 
discussion of the significance, consequences, or possible 
future of these relationships can be understood.
The CPSU's Grand Theft
It is of crucial importance to recognize that the 
current power structure, or "new oligarchy" of Russia 
formed, developed, and then burgeoned into a powerful force 
as a result of economic forces. (Ideology is dead). In 
particular, an unintended consequence of Gorbachev's 
"perestroika" program was that it served as the major
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catalyst for the "new capitalism" in Russia and facilitated 
its control by mobsters. Perestroika further served as the 
cloak under which the highly corrupt Kremlin leadership 
worked to transfer the Soviet state's wealth into private 
overseas accounts, investments, and enterprises.^
The KGB's role in perestroika was multi-faceted. 
Specifically, from 1989-91, it was a priority of the KGB 
First Chief Directorate (FCD), responsible for foreign 
intelligence, to create foreign business partnerships.^ As 
part of perestroika, the CPSU's official, stated purpose of 
its progrcua of forming joint ventures (JVs) with foreigners, 
and particularly foreign compemies, was to aid in the growth 
of the domestic economy.^ In reality, these JVs aided the 
corrupt Kremlin leadership in its removal of Soviet wealth 
to private interests outside Russia emd beyond the reach of 
anyone who would seek to repatriate it, including any 
domestic authority's control.
Indeed, many Russian investigators were sent to the 
West by the Russian government to locate the stolen wealth. 
However, when they succeeded in tracing the money, no 
criminal proceedings would be initiated.* Once evidence of 
fraud was found, as the investigators soon discovered, the 
Kremlin's determination to "recover" the stolen funds and 
punish those who perpetuated the fraud was quite insincere. 
Instead of making arrests, the authorities had reasoned that 
the bulk of the wealth had already been blended with honest
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money and, hence, was uncollectible. In addition to these 
factors, according to investigators, the exposure of the 
thieves would prove to be a major political embarrassment to 
the government since many of those currently holding 
government positions had either directed or held close ties 
with those individuals who actually controlled the stolen 
wealth.* In light of these conditions, Russiem prosecutors 
took no legal action.
These transfers of money emd resources were 
accomplished through KGB channels, which were the only 
channels open to such dealings, and which often employed OC 
elements to assist in the task. The KGB had the networks 
and the contacts, along with the information and know-how, 
to form and operate the front companies necessary to build 
these relationships. The KGB was the crucial link that 
cemented Soviet-Russia's political leaders to OC.
As proof, when the Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 
1991 Coup held hearings in February 1992, "About the Illegal 
Financial Activity of the CPSÜ" it found that virtually 
billions of dollars worth of state-owned hard cash and 
resources had been transferred out of the country by the 
leaders of the CPSÜ as the inevitable collapse of the Soviet 
Union approached; this was accomplished by utilizing De­
controlled banks and KGB couriers to negotiate the task."*
In the months preceding the USSR's official demise (December 
25, 1991), literally billions of dollars worth of state
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resources were simply "gone without a trace." Thus, the new 
and powerful oligarchical relationship had been secured. It 
is the remnants of this oligarchy which now controls Russia, 
for the current political leadership has maintained its 
numerous ties and associations with those guilty of the 
theft of the nation.
The Rapid Ascension of Organized Crime
OC elements did not gain power in partnership with the 
political elite and the KGB overnight. Corruption within 
the old Soviet oligarchy had become increasingly flagrant, 
particularly since 1953, the year of Stalin's death." As 
Victor Sheüsalin points out, during the Lenin and Stalin 
eras, KGB relations with OC elements entailed chekist 
infiltrations into crime groups^^ along with all others that 
existed in Soviet society, including those emigre groups 
that formed outside Soviet borders." As such, these 
infiltrations included the notorious "vory v zakone," or 
"thieves-in-law."
The "thieves-in-law" is an organization that consists 
of hardened criminals, many of whom have "made their bones." 
They pledge to be criminals and only criminals. As Gen. 
Gennady Chebotaryev of the MVD's Directorate of Organized 
Crime observes, they will never work a legal job, join the 
army, pay taxes, be law-eüaiding, etc.. Further, they must 
serve time in jail, a mark of their criminality and usually 
a prerequisite for them to move up in the ranks. In fact.
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during the Soviet era, it was in the gulag that ranks euid 
rites had been renewed.
According to an informant, the KGB infiltrated the 
"thieves-in-law" by introducing its young recruits into the 
crime group. The KGB would then track and aid their 
"progress up the ranks" by creating situations whereby they 
could act to elevate their status. Note that the KGB 
controlled the prisons. So, the KGB could further 
facilitate their moles' move up the ranks while they did 
their prison time. In effect, the KGB nursed them all the 
way to the top, managing key penetrations. Thus, the KGB 
gained some control, and derived the benefits with which 
control brings, by infiltrating these groups."
However, during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, the 
nature of KGB-criminal relationships changed: the KGB began 
to work with the criminal groups to achieve their and the 
communist party leaders' specific criminal goals; in other 
words, corruption became reunpant.Moreover, during 
Andropov's long tenure as KGB chief and ultimately party 
leader, these associations became more sophisticated and 
highly developed."
The Perennial Chekist Services 
The KGB emerged unscathed from the monumental collapse 
of Soviet institutions. Indeed, the secret police apparatus 
remained a major pillar of power within Russia following 
communism's collapse. However, the cold war's end demeuided
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a new role for Russian intelligence. No longer was the 
KGB's mission the spread of and preservation of communism. 
Nor was Moscow to strive any longer to gain access to 
foreign resources under the cloak of the Workers' Party.
With the cold war's end and as a result of the adhesive 
development of the new Russian oligarchy, <md due to the 
change from a commemd to market economy, the nature of 
Russian espionage changed. Ideology was replaced by a 
desire for personal wealth.
For example, an officer at the Main Intelligence 
Directorate indicated that the security services were not 
interested in state secrets. Rather, efforts were now 
concentrated on discovering compromising information on 
individuals, specifically the wealthy and powerful, and then 
blackmailing them;" hence, the greater emphasis on economic 
intelligence. To understand this requires an understanding 
of the development of the new state of the Russian economy 
and the transformation, or transmogrification, of many 
Soviet institutions.
Developing the New Oligarchy Linkages
For the past few years, the gaining of personal wealth 
has served as the nexus between the political elite, the KGB 
and OC - - the "new oligarchy." To further illustrate the 
origins and propagation of this new oligarchy, let us 
exaunine the development of the Soviet-Russian banking and 
financial infrastructure.
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In order to facilitate the privatization process, 
numerous banks sprouted up throughout Russia, many with the 
help of government funds. * Typically, the Kremlin 
appointed the bank presidents amd managers, who gained their 
positions by way of their status in the patron-client system 
that operates in Russia. In line with this system, as 
previously mentioned, the Kremlin then utilized the banks as 
vehicles for transferring CCCP SU money and resources out of 
the country. These banks proved instrumental in providing 
favorable loans amd business contracts to other government 
clients as well.
During the early 1990s, most loans made by the Central 
Bank of Russia were made on the instructions of either the 
Russian parliament or top Kremlin officials (within the 
Executive Branch) Thus, stairt-up funds were provided by 
the Kremlin to business enterprises with whom the government 
formed JVs, in exchange for the credit. This way, money 
could be laundered by funnel ing it through a network of 
corrupt bankers, KGB front companies and couriers, and into 
lucrative investments and firms either in the West or under 
the control of OC at home.
Typically, the KGB would set up a front company with 
the loan money. Often, the extent of this "company" 
amounted to a temporary address, with the borrowed money 
actually going to other endeavors as "payment of services 
rendered," which services were in reality the transfer.
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investment, and management of ill-gotten funds, rather than 
for the stated "start-up" business as originally designated. 
Such was one method of robbing the state coffers.
Or, conversely, the banks amd the government teamed up. 
Here, the banks acquired shares in the JV companies in 
exchange for favoreUale loans to the government officials, 
who because their partners. Numerous government 
officials, bankers, and businessmen, many of whom had 
organized crime links, took advamtage of this governmental 
"loans-for-shares" program.
One company, which German intelligence (BND) identified 
as a former KGB spy asset during the cold war^^ and which 
had from 1989-91 served as a channel for transferring state 
resources out of the country, later formed a partnership 
with the government using state money amd capital. This was 
accomplished in order to continue milking the state for 
money and resources by gaining lucrative government 
contracts with the intent to defraud the government of its 
resources. Such firms then used the stolen wealth to 
purchase interests in valuable real estate, which, 
ultimately, evolved into wealthy and "legitimate" 
enterprises. The money would thereby be laundered. In 
these types of situations, the KGB acted as the agent for 
the government official and benefitted handsomely from it. 
Or, conversely, it was the former KGB front company that 
provided the start-up capital to the government official in
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excheuige for shares in the official's company or JV. 
Whichever method was used, they each served the ultimate 
purpose; mainly, the theft of state-owned resources.
Criminal Infiltration of Government 
One type of common partnership that served as an avenue 
for OC penetration of government involved investment firms 
whose function was to "assist" in the privatization of 
Soviet industry. The method employed here was that the 
government official conducting the privatization received 
the start-up capital from the investment firm. He then used 
his position and contacts in government to introduce his new 
investment partners, usually KGB and OC elements, into high 
government circles and helped to build and strengthen their 
ties. By such methods, then, was influence-peddling 
accomplished in post-Soviet Russia.
As these ties were forged throughout government, OC 
elements increasingly infiltrated the higher levels of 
business and government and built mutually profitable, even 
though criminally corrupt, relationships with both the KGB 
and the political elite. Thus, the new and powerful 
oligarchical relationship had been secured. These 
relationships became formalized by way of "democratic" 
parlieunentary elections.
In the December 1995 parliamentary elections, many KGB 
officers and organized criminals ran and won seats. 
Ironically, those who ran for political office were immune
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from prosecution, which invited many financial-fraud type 
criminals and questionable others to run for parliamentary 
seats. Many individuals took advantage of this legal 
glitch, seeking election, particularly in the lower house, 
the State Duma, specifically in order to avoid prosecution. 
Indeed, some candidates were already under criminal 
indictment.^*
The point is that, once seats were won, in turn, the 
law-making process could be thwarted. Not surprisingly, 
through promises of investing illegally obtained riches into 
their districts, seats were easily won by such candidates.
Of course, ceunpaign promises were rarely fulfilled.^®
It is not difficult to understand why laws affecting 
participants in OC activities remain in "draft" form; such 
laws remain unresolved because it benefits many legislators' 
interests if they remain unresolved. Those laws that had 
been passed were ambiguous and often only exacerbated the 
problems they were meant to resolve. For example, the "Law 
on Securities" that was adopted in April 1996 prescribed 
norms for the transfer of rights to securities that could be 
interpreted in different ways. Moreover, instead of 
facilitating the opening up of the securities market to new 
investors, the law, instead, has resulted in barring their 
entry."
Russia's organized criminals have amassed large enough 
fortunes that they now command immense influence and can
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provide the greatest financial support to Russian political 
elites amd candidates. As such, organized criminals either 
directly or indirectly control the government's domestic amd 
foreign policy. The ties are close, even intimate. When OC 
in a country becomes so powerful amd widespread that it 
affects the government's behavior, not only domestically but 
also in its foreign relations, it poses a threat not only to 
the state and government that it exerts control over, but to 
the entire world, especially the international business 
community. The amounts of money changing hands are 
substantial. An article in Forbes noted that between 1991- 
1995, Russians had transferred at least $60 billion into 
foreign bank accounts.^* The possession of this level of 
resources facilitates access to companies worldwide.
The Bamking Scams
Even though economic reforms were taking hold in Russia 
as Yeltsin consolidated his power, by the end of 1992, many 
reformers had been forced out of influential positions in 
both the government and the KGB, and were replaced by hard­
liners. As a group of economists observed, even the Central 
Bank was under the apparatchik's control.^* Even so, 
reforms continued to progress. However, within this process 
of change, it was OC structures, not democratic 
institutions, that were becoming dominant throughout Russian 
society.
Russian journalist Victor Semyonov reported that in the
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early 1990s many Russian banks went bemkrupt, often with 
hundreds of billions of rubles "drifting" from one 
collapsing bank to another, with each bank in this cycle 
eventually collapsing. These banks, he noted, came to be 
called "ghost banks" because they seemed to be there, but in 
essence, neither the bank nor the money actually existed. 
Further, he noticed that, typically, bamk memagement would 
claim that the bank went under not as a result of poor 
management, but because it had been forced to do "good" 
party work for the local Russian CPs.^° It is, then, no 
surprise that many banks went bankrupt since they were 
simply used as the means by which capital was transferred 
out of Russia and money was laundered by government 
officials and their cronies.
Another common method used by city government 
officials was to form a JV with a foreign partner, who would 
be responsible for gaining the credit for the enterprise. 
This method operated in the following manner: In advance, 
the foreign partner would sign off the credited funds to the 
city government official, who then would use his influence 
to "lean on" the bank to provide the credit to the foreign 
partner. The bemk would then extend the credit emd transfer 
the money to the foreign partner. In other words, the money 
was transferred into private coffers owned by the city 
government official, and the foreign partner disappeared 
with his cut. The bank would seek out its money, ultimately
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imploring the city government for help; the city government 
or the Duma "investigated" only to declare the contract as 
fraudulent or unsound, resulting in the contract being 
nullified. For "undetermined" reasons (the Economic Crimes 
Department of the Moscow police is investigating the case), 
the bamk had decided not to take any further legal action 
and simply accounted for its losses as a debt. Thus, the 
bank was defrauded emd the money was gone.^^
Another method, as described by Interior Minister 
Anatoly Kulikov, operates as follows: a high government 
official of some particular ministry would collude with a 
bank's top management, as well as with other "Caucasian 
nationalities," i.e., the mafia.* They would then create a 
fictitious stock company emd open an account for themselves 
in a Russian commercial bemk. They then would conclude an 
agreement on the purchase of some items to be used by that 
government ministry and that ministry would then transfer 
the payment into the account. In turn, the rubles were 
turned into cash, converted into dollars, and sent to 
private bank accounts. To complement the whole process, the
'Interestingly, state security and militia leaders were 
referring to the Chechens when they identified mafia members 
or criminals as "Caucasians.” Naturally, it was the 
Chechens that made convenient targets to blame the reunpant 
crime on in Russia, and particularly in Moscow. As Amy 
Knight noted, it has been the Yeltsin Administration's 
policy to blame Russia's crime epidemic on the Chechens. 
Indeed, the vast criminal Chechen mafia was used as 
justification for the military invasions of the recalcitremt 
republic, (Knight, Amy. Spies without Cloaks: The 
KGB's Successors. 1996: 179-181).
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embezzlement was concealed by forging a confirmation of 
receipt of the goods.
Numerous methods to defraud both the government emd 
business, including the tremsfer of goods out of the country 
and then simply writing them off as lost, uncollectible, bad 
debt, etc. were, and continue to be employed on a grand 
scale. As such, emd to the detriment of the development of 
viable economic institutions, numerous government-backed 
banks and factories soon faced insolvency.
With schemes like these proliferating throughout 
Russia, it becomes clearer as to why so many bankers have 
increasingly fallen victim to contract hitmen. Thus, the 
symbiotic relationships between Russian political 
leaders/elites, the KGB, and OC figures continued to 
develop.
The ties that developed between those individuals and 
groups who comprise the new oligarchy beceuae highly 
intertwined through the privatization of the security and 
intelligence services as the Soviet Union began to break up. 
The numerous organizational changes that had occurred from 
1991 to 1993 as the former KGB was "dismantled, " coupled 
with the high demand for skilled security to protect the 
banks and new businesses that formed as communism collapsed, 
had led many chekists to leave or retire from official KGB 
ranks to find more lucrative employment within the business 
sector and private security services.^ They did so while
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retaining old ties emd contacts, applying the same chekist 
technic[ues of operations employed by their communist 
predecessors to the advantage of their own private business 
pursuits, which more often than not, coincided with the 
interests of organized criminals.
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CHAPTER 4 
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
The global business environment of the 1990s meant new 
and additional roles for the KGB to play. The chekists* 
infiltration and control of Russia's domestic economy 
through their ties with the newly emerging bemking 
oligarchy, their control of the private security services, 
and their outright ownership and control of numerous 
business enterprises and resources, ensured the secret 
police's survival and growth even as other Soviet 
institutions collapsed throughout the FSU. Moreover, the 
KGB's enduring role in the Russian political process, in 
top-level decision-making, and Kremlin power struggles 
mandated its survival as a major pillar of Russian politics 
into the 21st century. Hence, the legacy of Kremlin-secret 
police symbiosis continues.
Indeed, with the 1995 broadening of the FSB's powers to 
include not only counterintelligence but also 
counterterrorism, fighting corruption and OC, and economic 
security, chekist involvement in all aspects of Russian 
society was assured.^
74
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The Explosive Growth of Private Security Services 
The early 1990s evidenced extreme cutthroat competition 
that ensued in the business sphere. Seeing the 
opportunities, many top KGB officers became partners with 
owners of successful emd potentially successful business 
ventures to gain control, in true KGB style, and to oversee 
production of and manage the operations of these ventures 
and, of course, to glean the profits.^
Through the utilization of its traditional tactics, the 
KGB used its position to force out those entrepreneurs who 
would not partner up: these entrepreneurs literally were 
"set up" and arrested with their business being confiscated 
and taken over by the KGB.^ Moreover, to aid in the control 
of business, KGB protection rackets beccime widespread/* As 
such, through "offering" and providing protection, the KGB 
extorted money from business owners. Many wealthy Russian 
entrepreneurs hired KGB agents to protect them from 
organized criminals.^  Moreover, many organized criminals 
operate protection services. The situation is, indeed, very 
complex. Today, the majority of businesses in Russia must 
pay bribes to operate, for protection rackets extort money 
from the banks down to the street kiosk vendors.^ In 1996, 
former CIA Director John Deutch testified to the Senate that 
up to 80% of all private businesses in Russia pay extortion 
fees.^ The coverage is close to complete.
Many chekists also formed private security services.
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Bemk management preferred to hire former KGB officers to 
provide security and bodyguard services because they had the 
most refined skills necessary to protect their patrons. 
Further, the KGB had the contacts and networks to act as 
couriers and they had information - - the knowledge of how 
to get it, where to get it, amd how to use it against 
competitors emd opposition. Thus, since OC controlled the 
majority of banks in Russia, the KGB begem working directly 
for OC.®
In addition, organized criminals had infiltrated 
numerous banks through the private security services as part 
of their effort to strengthen their control over prospective 
victims.® The KGB emd OC colleüaorated to work for identical 
institutions, and their own enrichment, to the detriment of 
the honest citizen. Corruption became so entrenched that by 
1996 the Prosecutor General's Office had rated banking to be 
the most criminal sector of the economy.
With organized criminals controlling the banking and 
financial sectors of Russia, money-laundering and fraud are 
conducted on a grand scale. However, Russiem law 
enforcement agencies fail to arrest or prosecute bankers - - 
for both political and logistical reasons. As Soviet and 
post-Soviet crime specialist Louise Shelley points out, 
"Existing Russian law enforcement is no match for the 
private bank security forces staffed by former KGB 
operatives.
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Symbiosis and Political Intrigue
By 1993, many KGB front compamies had been trams formed 
into dominamt actors in Russian society, some in reward for 
securing the political elites' stolen wealth overseas, 
others through gaining lucrative contracts by bribing 
government officials; these entities have achieved great 
political significance because of their wealth and 
influence. Although corruption became widespread throughout 
both reformist amd hard-line political circles, the rift 
between them still intensified as each struggled to hold and 
increase their own power and wealth.
Furthermore, as a result of the privatization of many 
former KGB officers, conflicts between political rivals 
inevitaüsly led to conflicts between the privately and the 
officially controlled chekists. For example, in December 
1994, Yeltsin sent members of his Korzhakov-led elite guards 
unit to raid Most Bank in Moscow in what is believed to have 
been am attempt to intimidate his political rival, Moscow 
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. Luzhkov maintained a large Moscow city 
budget account there and, moreover, was rumored to be the 
real control behind the bank, only using his close 
associate, Vladimir Goussinsky, (a part owner of the bank) 
as a front man.^^ Goussinsky had called upon the local FSK 
(the renamed Moscow KGB, which is under the control of the 
Moscow mayor, Luzhkov himself), for help but Yeltsin's 
forces (under Korzhakov), triumphed in the armed
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confrontation that followed.
Here, Yeltsin had blatemtly used the KGB as a tool of 
intimidation in an attempt to bring down his political 
opposition, just as his communist predecessors had done. In 
doing so, Yeltsin, a product of the Soviet system himself, 
ensured the continuation of the politicization of the state 
security forces, and has, in fact, used them increasingly in 
order to stay in power.
Soon after the showdown at Most Bank, in an attempt to 
better control the communications, financial, and 
informational transactions of Russia's banks, emd "to 
intensify the fight against organized crime," Yeltsin issued 
a decree "Concerning the Organs of Federal Government 
Communications and Information," conferring all 
communications and electronic transfers to FAPSI'S 
jurisdiction.1* Therefore, FAPSI, which is responsible 
directly to Yeltsin, gained responsibility for overseeing 
and issuing permits to banks and other economic entities 
that use data lines and electronic fund transfers to move 
money. Furthermore, FAPSI officially gained a monopoly over 
economic information, which is of great strategic value, 
particularly since the organization monitors both public and 
private communications.
Moreover, in an effort to coordinate the multiple 
security services conducting telephone surveillance, in 
early 1996, a decree "On the Control of Manufacturers and
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Users of Special Technical Devises Designed to Receive 
Information Secretly" was drafted to give overall 
coordination to the FSB. According to a Yeltsin 
Administration official, the decree was adopted because the 
situation "had gotten way out of hamd."^® Indeed, the 
owners and managers of mamy banks amd highly-profitaüale 
businesses employ their o%m intelligence forces to monitor 
their political and economic competition. For example, one 
Russiam businessman, Boris Berezovsky, claimed that his 
security force included 20 KGB technical surveillance 
specialists who tap the mobile phones of key government and 
business players, among others.^®
Contract Killings 
As the new oligarchy gained control of much of the 
Russian economy, killings of businessmen in the streets of 
Moscow and other urban areas reached an unprecedented level. 
In 1993, according to the Russian Interior Ministry, there 
were 102 contract killings of businessmen. By 1994, the 
number had soared to 562.^^ According to former Minister of 
the Interior Gen. Viktor Yerin, during the first quarter of 
1994 alone, there had been an average of 84 murders a day, 
most of which were contract killings arising from the 
struggle for markets.^® Further, according to a report of 
Prosecutor Gen. Yuri Skuratov, from 1990 to 1995 the murder 
rate doubled; in 1995 alone, there were over 31,000 cases of 
unsolved murders, nearly half of which involved businessmen.
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while close to 40% involved killings in which the victims 
were OC leaders.^® The numbers continued to spiral. In 
1996, there was a total of 640 suspected contract killings, 
roughly 90% of which went unsolved.^® Contract killers also 
executed mamy bankers and political officials. So, too, 
mamy journalists who chose to cover OC activities or speak 
out against bank operations were killed.
Many believed that the KGB was behind the killings.
The head of the Russian Committee to Protect Journalists, 
Oleg Panfilov, suspected that out of 42 serious attacks on 
journalists in 1995, at least half were instigated by 
government officials. Indeed, it is perceptions like these 
that have sabotaged many commitments the Russian media may 
have had to actualize a truly free press in Russia.
Such vicious attacks have generated widespread fear 
among Russian journalists to publish any unbiased articles 
on crime and corruption, or to editorialize against banks 
and OC. One contract involved a newspaper owner/parliament 
member who was killed after his newspaper published a list 
of nauaes of top "thieves-in-law."^^ Notaüaly, many 
journalists were targeted when their coverage became 
"uncomfortaible" to powerful interests.
According to the Minister of the Interior, the high 
cost of hiring elite killers can only be paid by powerful 
and wealthy interests. The cost of a hit normally ranges 
from $20,000 to $50,000, reaching to a peaik rate of
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$100,000. Furthermore, the Interior Minister asserted that 
the top killers were "as a rule former sabotage experts of 
the Main Intelligence Departments of the Defence Ministry or 
of the First Main Department of the KGB." Their targets 
consisted of "big bankers, industrialists, and 'sharks' of 
the criminal world"^*
Indeed, it has been found that many contract killings 
were in fact fulfilled by both KGB officers and "military- 
types" (GRU), utilizing the private security services and 
detective and protection offices which were operated by the 
KGB; such access allowed for the necessary avenues to 
investigate emd surveil targets in preparation for the kill 
and also helped camouflage the identity of the assailant. 
Moreover, many former special forces soldiers and KGB agents 
work directly for OC groups, who pay off local law 
enforcement agencies, which have become highly 
criminalized.^^ Deputy Police Chief Boris Kondrashov said 
that in Moscow alone, there had been some 960 officers 
dismissed in 1995 while 2000 more awaited trial for 
corruption.^® It is for these reasons that most crimes 
remain unsolved and, further, more extreme methods are 
increasingly being employed to fulfill the murder contracts.
According to Mikhail Slinko, formerly of the General 
Prosecutor's Department of Organized Crime and Murder 
Investigations, since 1993, the use of explosive devices to 
fulfill contract murders has become a "specific criminal
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problem".^® It was reported that in the first five months 
of 1993, there were more than 40 cases of explosives being 
used for criminal purposes.^® In one June 1996 sweep alone, 
Moscow police seized 3920 pounds of explosives.®^
While official law enforcement was supposed to be 
operating according to new, however confusing, penal codes, 
the private security services operated with impunity for no 
meaningful laws governing them existed. In 1992, the "Law 
on Private Detective and Security Activity" was passed. It 
prohibited single enterprises from conducting both detective 
and security functions; as a result, the private security 
services simply formed subsidiaries, separating the two 
functions. This law is largely ineffective in controlling 
the services' activities; indeed, legal constraints are more 
lacking in the private arena than those that have been 
codified for official state security forces.
It is very plausible that many contract killings 
originate within government circles. As Gen. Vladimir 
Rushailo, head of the Moscow Regional Agency for Combating 
OC (RAOC), which is responsible for arresting and 
prosecuting specific OC groups such as the " thieves - in-law" 
and offenses involving official corruption noted, if a 
"thief-in-law" is caught, he "is not afraid of going to 
prison because he knows he will be well off there."
However, a corrupt official possesses a very, strong fear of 
losing his position of power, and therefore, as Rushailo
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concludes, "he is prepared to take resolute steps."®® And, 
indeed, it makes sense that government officials were and 
are often the financiers of contract killings. Moreover, it 
is government officials (nomenklatura and KGB), in addition 
to the organized criminals, that hold vast interests in 
private enterprise in Russia.
The Ambiguous Legal Design 
The RAOC, like other Russian agencies responsible for 
fighting OC, is for the most part made impotent due to the 
fact that any real laws or even courts to conduct criminal 
proceedings simply do not exist in any meaningful way. In 
one case, in 1996, a psychiatric evaluation for a murder 
suspect lasted four minutes and took place in the hallway 
outside the courtroom.®* Such procedures do not promote 
any respect for law. The dean of the Moscow State Legal 
Academy, Oleg E. Kutafin, clarified the point when he stated 
that "laws and rights by themselves mean nothing if there 
isn ' t an economic and social structure to enforce them". ®® 
Moreover, procedures to enforce the law, which itself 
is ambiguous, remain unclear and unrealistic. For example, 
on January 1, 1997, a new penal code went into effect. 
However, the new economic crimes the code lists are "so 
cunbiguously defined that it will be virtually impossible to 
bring wrongdoers to justice." For instance, it is now a 
crime to "illegally receive or disseminate commercial 
secrets" - but what constitutes a commercial secret is not
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addressed. Honey-laundering "on a large scale" is now 
punishable by up to 10 years in prison, as is confiscation 
of property - but "large scale" is undefined.®® The law 
cannot very well be enforced, particularly within the 
economic sphere, when figures on trade, teuc collection, 
budgets, currency reserves, and, for that matter, any 
statistics whatsoever are inaccurate. Furthermore, no 
central authority exists to gather such information and 
there is no official government cooperation or funds 
appropriated to develop and institutionalize a process to 
collect the data, let alone evaluate it.®^ ®®
The economic information that is being gathered 
consists of that which the KGB-operated private security 
services collect on potential business partners, on 
competition, in credit assessments, etc., for themselves, 
their patrons, and their clients. Realizing that they could 
market their knowledge of espionage tradecraft, many of the 
privatized KGB officers took on additional tasks of engaging 
in economic intelligence and counterintelligence, providing 
information as a vital part of their services.®®
As the demand for these types of services increased, 
many KGB officers branched out from the private security 
services and set up consultant firms to put together deals 
and work the system for foreign clients and JV partners, who 
were uneüale to operate in the new Russian business 
environment where knowing the right people and paying bribes
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are mandated for success. In eui environment where OC 
controls almost all banking emd business, teuces are 
exorbitant, significant legal structures vis-a-vis business 
emd most other spheres eure lacking, and law-enforcement 
officials teüce bribes instead of fighting crime, emy foreign 
investor would be lost in ambiguities.
In fact, the system is designed so that foreign 
investors will be uneüole to accomplish emything unless they 
hire the services of the KGB, (i.e. private security 
services), to assist them. The old Russian saying, "The law 
in Russia is like a Icunp-post. You cem always get around 
it"*° is made to ring true with the aid of the KGB. 
Yeltsin-appointed former Economic Minister Yegor Gaidar 
accurately described the Russian business environment when 
he observed in 1995 that the success of an enterprise often 
depends on whether the manager pays bribes, obtains 
privileges, and develops "sufficiently high patrons.*® Even 
so, the Kremlin leadership plays a key role in maintaining 
this environment, as it greatly assures Yeltsin's continued 
power through the critical support he receives by 
accommodating wealthy business interests.
Yeltsin has built up a very powerful security and 
intelligence apparatus, much of which is answerable directly 
to him. In other words, he has gained KGB support in his 
bid to hold power by providing numerous concessions to the 
chekists. Indeed, in order to gain the security and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
intelligence organizations' support during a period of great 
unrest and instability within Russia, Yeltsin has further 
bolstered KGB powers through a smoke screen of a forceful 
drive to fight crime amd corruption.
The Crime and Corruption Campaign 
Ironically, KGB powers and ranks have been increasing 
since 1991 under the auspices of an urgent need to fight 
crime and corruption.*^ However, in reality, the only top- 
level criminal elements rooted out are those who refuse to 
cooperate with the KGB; these end up either dead or in jail.
One report stated that between 1993-95, Korzhakov's SBP 
organized the contract killings of close to 25% of top 
"thieves-in-law" leaders.*® Further, it was indicated that 
the aim had been to punish those who extorted government 
officials instead of cooperating with them in their illegal 
business schemes. Both Korzhakov and former GUO-head tuimed 
FSB-head Barsukov had worked closely with Yeltsin to ensure 
his hold on power emd to further his goals. (Whether 
Yeltsin was aware of specific killings is beyond the scope 
of this paper).
Furthermore, those former chekists who took on the 
Kremlin when a KGB-brokered deal went sour would ultimately 
lose out. For exemple, one ex-KGB major was jailed as a 
result of a conflict with FSB-chief Barsukov that arose over 
a deal involving the KGB front company the KGB officer was 
operating and an agreement with Barsukov to supply
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surveillemce equipment to the FSB. Later, Barsukov broke 
the contract and when the KGB officer sought reparations, he 
was jailed.** Thus, the campaign to fight crime emd 
corruption is indeed very selective.
The system is designed to facilitate Kremlin control of 
both political and economic adversaries. For example, the 
controversial 1994 law "On The Urgent Measures To Defend The 
Population Against Gangsterism And Other Kinds of Organized 
Crime," outlined in the report on "The New Stage of the 
Fight with Organized Crime in Russia,"*^ provides for 
warrantless invasions of privacy and detention up to 30 days 
under mere suspicion, thus eneUaling Russian security and 
intelligence officers to legally go after opposition and 
competition in the neume of "fighting organized crime."*® 
Thereby, Yeltsin ensured political non-interference in the 
criminal endeavors of those chekists and their networks that 
supported him, which, by 1993 were entrenched in all memner 
of criminal enterprises throughout the country. Moreover, 
the Kremlin provides safeguards for many enterprises that 
are currently under firm OC control; that is, if their 
owners and executives do not join Yeltsin's political 
opposition but, instead, contribute to his political support 
base.
The reality is that Yeltsin has given free rein to the 
KGB's successors to engage in bribery and extortion, conduct 
illegal business, ignore legalities, etc., in exchange for
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support and assistance in carrying out political intrigues 
in the Kremlin. After all, his goal is to stay in power, 
not an easy feat in an environment of perennial power 
struggles within top political circles, where political 
ploys are a constant part of the scene.
Surveillance Within Russiam Society 
As the successor to the former KGB SCO, the FSB is 
responsible for counterintelligence and domestic security. 
Indeed, the search for spies among the Russian populace 
continues. The activities and contacts of foreigners 
visiting amd living in Russia are vigilantly monitored by 
the KGB's successors. However, the mass Russian populace no 
longer fears arrest and interrogation as the automatic 
result of any acquaintances with foreigners.*^
Nevertheless, the Russian populace is not immune from the 
FSB's surveillance. A Russian law faculty survey indicated 
that 7.5 million Russians had their telephones illegally 
tapped in 1995.*® According to a Moscow News report, every 
district telephone station in Moscow has a special room with 
up to 50 people working per shift who are "selectively" or 
"constantly" conducting telephone surveillance and, further, 
intercepting phone conversations. *®
As the domestic intelligence service incrementally 
regained its powers, so too, its calls for vigilance against 
foreign spies became louder. By June 1996, FSB-chief 
Kovalev was declaring "an unprecedented growth of foreign
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intelligence activity" in Russia.®® A report that surfaced 
about the same time as Kovalev's statement of concern noted 
that, according to Yeltsin, eleven foreigners had been 
expelled from Russia in 1995, 28 Russiems had been arrested 
for espionage, and 67 attempts to pass secrets to 
(presumably) foreign intelligence services had been thwarted 
by the Russian security services.®®
Indeed, in June 1997, FSB-chief Kovalev went on 
television to offer extra pay any Russians spying for 
foreign powers; all they had to do was become double agents 
for Moscow. Further, he added, "Don't call, and we'll find 
you anyway." A phone number for the purpose of contacting a 
duty officer answering calls on the hotline was provided.®® 
Moreover, foreign diplomats and suspected foreign 
agents are kept under close surveillance. In 1997, U.S. 
officials discovered that the security of the American 
Embassy (the old building is embedded with uncountable bugs) 
in Moscow had again been seriously penetrated. The April 
1997 penetration has been described as "an inauspicious 
episode" in light of the super-heavy security that exists at 
the complex as work to build four new floors, two of which 
are hoped to be edasolutely secure, is underway. A reporter 
for the New York Times wrote that an AWOL Russian soldier 
had slipped into the Acting U.S. Ambassador's residence, 
spent the night, and was discovered the next day teücing a 
shower there.®® Much to the chagrin of American officials.
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the Russian intelligence services continue to compromise the 
security of U.S. diplomatic buildings in Moscow.
Even though post-Soviet Russian society has opened up 
to some extent and people speak out much more freely, fear 
of the security services is still, nevertheless, prevalent. 
For example, in December 1994, there was a report indicating 
that some Russian soldiers who had been captured in Chechnya 
were afraid to return home because of the presence amd 
possible questioning by the FSK (later renamed the FSB).®* 
And in an area closer to home, Mikhail Dubitsky, a 
security officer at Global One, (a telecom consortium), 
stated that, "Russiam hackers are terrified of getting mixed 
up with the mafia or running afoul of our secret services. 
Maybe that's why our hackers tend to break into systems that 
are located aüaroad. They know that in Russia they'll be 
dealt with Russian style."®®
The KGB's successors' continuous calls for vigilance 
against foreign spies demonstrates the pervasive chekist 
mindset that persists and is felt within every sector of 
post-Soviet Russian society. Today, in Russia, many citizen 
groups, non-profit organizations, and other civic groups 
that formed during glasnost, and through the 1990s, for the 
most part operate freely, without much interference from the 
security services. Even though most of these groups are 
struggling to survive in the face of severe economic 
hardships, and rarely have a significant voice, much less
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effect the political process, a KGB successor agency still 
monitors them. According to an article in the Los Angeles 
Times, this chekist agency "blurts an occasional warning 
that their U.S. funding threatens Russian national 
security."®® As long as these organizations remain 
ineffective and without significant funding, the chekists 
will most likely not intervene in their activities.
The Russian people have not freed themselves fully from 
the repressive grasp of the secret police. Until the public 
demands the liberty to espouse opposing political 
viewpoints, until public officials recognize civil rights 
and other freedoms, including the right to private property, 
the new oligarchy will continue to control the states' 
resources and, hence, deprive the mass public of its right 
to a decent life and a share in their nation's wealth. 
Moreover, the secret police will continue to thwart the 
process of democratization that began in what was hoped by 
millions of people in the former Soviet Union to be the end 
of the "Soviet way of life."
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CHAPTER 5 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
The New Global Environment 
Russia's foreign intelligence service, in contrast to 
its domestic intelligence, was subjected to an entirely 
different set of conditions under which it had to operate 
following communism's demise. Indeed, with communism dead, 
the KGB PCD faced the loss of an ideological mission. The 
effect on foreign intelligence was much greater than that on 
domestic intelligence since the espionage apparatus relied 
much more heavily on ideology to motivate its officers and 
agents, providing them with a strong sense of purpose that 
served to justify their deeds in their own minds and drove 
them to recruit others.
While the domestic KGB had basically served as a 
repressive machine to keep strict order among the populace, 
while protecting the power of the communist regime from 
subversion from within, the foreign intelligence service had 
worked to "spread the revolution." This loss of mission, 
coupled with the exposure of the secret police's past 
crimes, led many of the KGB's foreign intelligence officers
96
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and agents to become disillusioned with the old Soviet 
system and their role in supporting and furthering the cause 
of what had been a self-serving emd woefully corrupt regime; 
consequently, defections from the intelligence service were 
widespread. ^ Those officers that remained with the 
political police faced a "new Russia" that posed conflicting 
perceptions of what the KGB successor agency's mission was 
to be in a greatly changed world.
Not only did the KGB face a loss of a political 
ideological mission, it also had to deal with a new economic 
system. Russia's transformation, in the wake of communism's 
demise, from a command to a free-market economy more 
completely changed the nature of the Russian intelligence 
service than any other factor. Moreover, communism's 
collapse throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
meant that Russia's foreign intelligence service lost a 
large portion of its cash budget^ (particularly monies that 
had poured in from communist satellites throughout the cold 
war) ; it lost the support of numerous allies, which meant, 
more importantly, that it no longer enjoyed the liaison 
with, and access to close to 150 sigint stations within 
former Warsaw Pact countries ; ^ and it lost other benefits 
derived from its former close relationships with numerous 
other communist state and Soviet bloc intelligence services.
Nevertheless, Russia's transforming economy provided 
the chekists the opportunity to exploit the situation to
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their advantage. As discussed, many KGB officers from the 
former KGB PCD formed JVs with Western companies emd 
businessmen whom were eager to do business eurid maüce profits 
in the new capitalist Russia. The role of "businessman" 
provided the perfect cover for the "former" KGB officers. 
Moreover, beyond serving as a potential means of laundering 
money, building partnerships with Western firms provided the 
chekists access to that firm's particular industry emd, 
hence, its technology and secrets.
Just as the INO had utilized trading companies in the 
1920s as an espionage base,^^ now the SVR utilized business 
enterprises, mostly JVs, in the 1990s for the same purpose 
and in a similar manner. The difference is that SVR 
officers now spied on the West to enrich themselves, not the 
state; they now had and have a personal stake in their 
spying success that is astonishingly different than it had 
been during Soviet rule, and one that has been potentially 
much more lucrative. The KGB-SVR's place within the new 
oligarchy and its officers' linkages with 00 and, further, 
their patrons who enjoy official government positions, have 
successfully transferred control and ownership of the former 
Soviet state's wealth to their own private coffers; this has 
occurred at the expense of the mass Russian public, which 
continues to suffer under the new system, to a larger degree 
than it had under communism.
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In addition to its loss of influence within its own 
"sphere of influence," the Soviet Union lost much of its 
international political influence and, therefore, numerous 
clients, which, in turn, was followed by the breakdown of 
many of its espionage networks in other areas of the world. 
As such, the Russian foreign intelligence service has been 
struggling to rebuild its fragmented spy networks, and 
regain its access to foreign markets, particularly arms 
markets, and achieve its former superpower status. Russia's 
espionage efforts not only continue, but have escalated, as 
the Russian foreign intelligence services (specifically, the 
SVR and GRU) strive to undermine the West and thwart U.S. 
hegemony.
Contrary to the claim that the KGB "no longer exists", 
in reality, the foreign section of the former KGB is simply 
operating under a new neune - the SVR. As far back as 1992, 
when most of the world viewed Russia as "no longer a 
threat," SVR-chief Primeücov was assuring students of 
intelligence at the Moscow Institute of International 
Relations that even as Russia was experiencing rapid 
changes, its foreign intelligence remained "up to the 
mark."® As many high-level decision-makers in the West were 
becoming more relaxed eibout their concern over the Russian 
intelligence services' activities immediately following 
communism's demise, Primakov was stressing to these students 
that it was important to "trace processes in the United
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States and other countries that could objectively lead to a 
certain destabilization of the situation.
The Center for Security Policy reported in 1994 that 
one of the mamy Soviet-style intelligence operations being 
operated against the U.S. was, "the exploitation by Russian 
intelligence of the relaxed post-Cold War atmosphere amd 
reduced U.S. vigilance on security matters to recruit 
"sleepers" —  agents in place who will be activated as the 
need subsequently arises."® Russian foreign intelligence 
activities in the U.S. have continued virtually unabated, 
and, further, as Washington officials have confirmed, have 
increased since the collapse of communism.® The SVR's 
efforts in the U.S. will be discussed later in the chapter.
Just as the cold war's end required a reorientation of 
Western intelligence services, so, too, Russian foreign 
intelligence shifted its orientation; at least, that was the 
official version from the Kremlin. Moscow claimed that the 
growing threats of OC, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, 
drug trafficking, money laundering, and economic crimes had 
become the larger priorities for its security and 
intelligence services to fight. But rather than fight these 
threats, the SVR, instead, has fueled them. Evidence has 
shown that these types of activities have only escalated, in 
their number and degree; Russian security and intelligence 
officers have engaged in wide-ranging criminal behaviors for 
their own self-fulfilling purposes. More recently, it has
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been reported that some former KGB officers work for both 
the SVR and Russian organized crime. This "discovery" was 
no surprise to many people, paurticularly the cynical Russian 
populace.
The true priorities of Russia's foreign intelligence 
service are economic, industrial, technological, and 
political espionage, the reintegration of the "near abroad," 
and the negotiation of lucrative arms deals. As such, the 
SVR is waging a new industrial/economic espionage offensive 
against the West. In accordance with the fact that domestic 
and foreign events are inherently linked, so, too, are 
Russian domestic and foreign intelligence objectives.
Since the ability to operate in the current Russian 
business/economic environment is crucial to the success of 
virtually any enterprise in Russia today, as J. Michael 
Waller observed, many KGB officers do not attempt to 
camouflage their professional intelligence careers by 
assuming a cover, as they had done during the Soviet years. 
Instead, they advertise their chekist affiliations, offering 
their knowledge of spy tradecraft as an added feature of 
their services available to private businesses.
In conducting their investigations and in their work 
under the guise of private security services, KGB officers 
research company histories in order to evaluate their 
potential for service as vehicles to gain (secret) 
information. In other words, they seek to identify
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businesses that could maüce worthwhile espionage targets. 
Further, assessments as to the viability of developing 
partnerships with targeted foreign companies are made. If 
history provides us any lesson, the SVR endeavors to 
purchase certain proprietaries; that is, cost-effective 
analysis is employed to determine whether purchasing a firm 
is cheaper than efforts to steal the desired information. 
Obviously, this scenario poses an ominous espionage threat 
to governments and private businesses.
The chekists not only "protect" businesses (under the 
cover of private security services) in Russia but are also 
partners in them, particularly those which are highly 
profitable. To compete in a global market that is 
increasingly dependent on the efficient use of information 
technology, where businesses are required to utilize high- 
tech computers and software programs to gain market share, 
it only makes sense that, lacking this technology, a 
priority of the KGB-operated side of the JVs must be the 
acquisition of Western technology; this, of course, is 
acquired through espionage. It is their (the Russian side 
of the JVs) "raison d'etre." To acquire it legally would 
take great sums of money and years of research and 
development. Inevitably, the JVs, particularly when located 
on foreign soil, are utilized as fronts for espionage, money 
laundering, spy recruiting, and to target, assess, and
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access industries in which technology and trade secrets may 
be acquired.
The Drivers of the Espionage Offensive
The vital need for industrial technology to aid the 
ailing Russian economy has been the Russian government's 
impetus for the espionage offensive currently being waged by 
SVR officers, in addition to the potential attainment of 
great increases in the officers' own personal wealth. So, 
too, the need for economic information to aid the Russians 
in gaining market share in a highly competitive world, now 
that their economic system has chemged from a central to a 
capitalist, if only a nascent capitalist one, also drives 
the espionage effort.
The West has witnessed a Kremlin-orchestrated assault 
on the privacy of its corporate secrets on a worldwide 
scale. Indeed, there has been an accelerated increase in 
Russian espionage activities. Not only is defense-related 
technology sought, in addition, more recently, it is 
industrial, economic, and proprietary information that is 
being sought by the Russian intelligence services on a grand 
scale.
In recognizing this increased threat, in its Annual 
Report to Congress on Foreign Intelligence Collection and 
Industrial Espionage, published in July 1995, the National 
Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) reported that 
"traditional espionage methods primarily reserved for
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collecting national defense information are now being 
applied to collect economic emd proprietary information."^^
Law and Functions of Foreign Intelligence
Concurrent with Yeltsin's January 1996 appointment of 
SVR-head Primakov to the post of Foreign Minister, and his 
replacement as chief of foreign intelligence with Primakov's 
first deputy. Col. Gen. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Yeltsin signed 
a new "Law on Foreign Intelligence," which had been passed 
by the Duma a few days earlier, in December 1995. It 
appears that the law was passed in order to provide SVR 
officers with clear mission objectives emd a concise 
understanding of their goals; and further, to "legitimize" 
their operations, particularly within the economic sphere.
In addition to codifying the status and functions of 
the SVR," there was written into this law a noticeable 
emphasis on economic intelligence and espionage. New deputy 
SVR-head Scherbakov outlined SVR objectives within the 
economic intelligence sphere; these were, to assess foreign 
influence on Russia's economy, to facilitate integration 
within the former USSR, to forestall foreign threats to 
Russia's economic security, to assist the government in 
attracting foreign investment, and to thwart money- 
laundering activities of foreign and domestic criminal 
groups. Further, he asserted that the SVR would play a 
major role in overseeing Russian arms deals through its 
analysis of the international arms market and, furthermore.
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provide advice to Russian suppliers and manufacturers 
concerning various middlemen.
The extensive list of tasks outlined here covers merely 
one sphere, the economic. Russia's foreign intelligence 
service is responsible for carrying out wide-ranging emd 
complex operations and activities, which demand the use of a 
great amount of intelligence resources. The SVR's tasks are 
not limited to economic espionage but also include 
political, industrial, computer, technological, emd defense- 
related espionage.
In today's mostly non-communist world, a different 
world that faces more diversified threats than those posed 
during the cold war, the SVR's priorities changed 
accordingly. Hence, beyond those already mentioned, the 
SVR's responsibilities now further include fighting the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, drug and arms trafficking, 
money-laundering, international OC, ethnic uprisings, 
economic crime, and the promotion of "reintegration" with 
the "near abroad." Notably, many of these functions have a 
"law-enforcement" tint to them, which tasks had 
traditionally been left to the regular police. However, to 
justify the continuation of its massive budget, and to 
provide its officers with a new sense of purpose to replace 
the "spread of the revolution," the foreign intelligence 
service ed)sorbed these additional tasks. Conveniently, in 
performing these traditional "law enforcement tasks," the
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SVR increased its ability to gather intelligence and engage 
in and coordinate its espionage, as its reach was thereby 
extended. In turn, its power and control also increased.
KGB-Organized Crime Collaboration in Espionage
The problem that confronts the world, particularly the 
world of international business, is that the SVR is actually 
working with the organized criminals in many spheres, more 
particularly within the economic sector. As discussed 
previously, memy former KGB officers now work for OC-run 
banks and, more importantly, maintain their ties with the 
Russian intelligence services. Both OC figures^^ and 
"former" KGB officers engage in protection rackets. Hence, 
there is obviously some OC-SVR collaboration in gaining 
economic intelligence to the benefit of the enterprises that 
are jointly (OC-KGB) operated. As such, organized criminals 
aid the intelligence officers' espionage efforts for mutual 
benefit. In many arenas, the organized criminals and 
Russian intelligence officers enjoy a lucrative, symbiotic 
relationship.
As Amy Knight speculates, the high numbers of former 
foreign intelligence officers who now work for privatized 
firms such as banks very likely gain and use intelligence 
service-related inside information for the benefit of these 
private firms .Th us,  Russian foreign intelligence is 
working for private business interests.
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This intimate link between Russian business and 
intelligence has fueled the SVR's global propaganda effort 
comparing itself with the CIA" within the "democratic" 
realm. However, unlike the Russian foreign intelligence 
service, the CIA does not gather and provide economic 
intelligence to one major corporation one day and another 
the next, for, to do so, presents the American capitalist 
system with a problem: that is, how to determine which 
individual or firm gets the intelligence while keeping the 
playing field level.
The post-communist world is distinguished by global 
trade and the search for markets. The development and 
widespread application of high-end information technology 
has opened up many economies to new vulnerabilities. 
Specifically, many Western societies have become computer 
and software driven, resulting in a new dependency and, 
hence, a new vulnerability.
As computer security expert Peter E. Sakkas observes,
"a dangerous level of exposures to terrorist activity, 
sabotage, and espionage exists in the political-economic 
security of world trade, international finance and global 
business." He points out that "the increasing globalization 
of computer networks has increased their vulnereUaility to 
potential attacks."" Sakkas contended that the "Osnaz" 
forces, which, during the cold war, had operated under the 
control of the KGB and had been used as the KGB's terrorist
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apparatus, may otter their software emd computer knowledge 
to commercial enterprises, terrorist orgemizations, and 
criminal syndicates in order to meüce a living in the 1990s.
Seückas* contention is quite valid in light of the 
Russiem government's growing economic crisis situation, emd 
its resultant ineUbility to pay its militeury forces, public 
servants, educators, scientists, workers, and pensioners. 
Moreover, the types of skills these "Osnaz" forces possess 
are currently in high demand, greatly increasing the 
likelihood that OC groups emd terrorist organizations will 
become even more sophisticated as the world enters the 21st 
century.
Sakkas observes that cooperation between former Soviet 
agents and international criminal organizations "is ominous 
because it exponentially extends their power and influence 
in the white-collar world."" Evidently, in 1991, KGB Maj. 
Gen. Vyacheslav Artomov told David Wise, (an intelligence 
writer and author of the recent book on CIA turncoat Aldrich 
Ames, Wightmover) ^ that "the policy of the present bosses 
[of Directorate Z] is that these people [wire-tap 
technicians] should not be made pariahs. If you force them 
into a tight comer, people with these skills can join all 
sorts of M a f i a s . R o g u e  states, lacking state-of-the-art 
expertise in this field, surely seek to "rent the brains 
to achieve their goals, whether they be of a conventional
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terrorist nature, a "new breed" terrorist variety,or 
nuclear weapons seeking.
Computer security expert Wayne Madsen points out that, 
"the major targets for state-sponsored computer espionage 
are industrial and technological s e c r e t s . F o r  example, he 
noted that the Hannover computer espionage ring, which made 
hundreds of attempts to penetrate U.S. military and other 
computer systems, some of which were successful, had been 
recruited by the KGB in Berlin in 1985. These spies 
received payment in the form of drugs and money. However, 
four years later, in 1989, the West Germem 
Bundeskriminalalamant (BKA) arrested the ring's members for 
engaging in espionage for the KGB.^ "* Surely, this was not 
an isolated cell, particularly with the phenomenal growth of 
computer systems and application technology throughout the 
late 1980s and 1990s.
The French SDECE, in 1983, obtained KGB Department T 
(technology) documents indicating that 2.4% of Soviet 
espionage operations involved computer h a c k i n g . N o  doubt, 
this percentage has soared, particularly as has the 
development of the global communications network, the 
Internet, and access to computer emd phone lines world-wide. 
Indeed, Russian intelligence officers and agents can engage 
in espionage against the West from Europe, Asia, and 
elsewhere in the world (wherever a computer and 
communications link are available), and, thus, can more
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easily avoid physical surveillance or prosecution from 
Western counterintelligence, making the threat even more 
insidious.
Even though Russia does not produce its own computer 
chips, its capabilities within the computer sphere are well- 
developed. According to Madsen's list of "Computer- 
Communications Espionage Capabilities of Intelligence and 
Law Enforcement Agencies," Russia and the CIS show the top 
capabilities rating of " e x c e l l e n t . M u c h  of Russia's 
ability to develop weapons is a consequence of its 
technological espionage offensives and exploitations. For 
example, in 1997, the Russian government managed to get a 
U.S. firm to export two supercomputers, thus greatly 
increasing its capabilities within the weapons testing and 
development sphere."
On February 27,28, 1996, the U.S. House Banking 
Committee, chaired by Jeunes Leach (R-IA), exeunined the 
threat from counterfeiting, credit card fraud, and bank 
theft over global banking networks.^® The committee 
concluded that many of these types of sceuns are tied to 
international OC networks. The FBI's Moscow office, which 
was established in 1994, estimated then that there were 5600 
OC groups with 100,000 active members in the FSU. Further, 
officials estimated that 300 Soviet gangs had moved abroad, 
with at least 24 of them moving to American cities. In 
1995, the FBI's Moscow office uncovered a computerized
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embezzlement scheme involving Russians that had drained more 
than $8 million from a U.S. bank."
Russian OC groups, in fact, have phenomenal eunounts of 
cash and have formed alligmces with other OC groups, 
particularly the Italiems emd Colombians." For the first 
time, in 1994, DBA agents uncovered evidence of Russian OC 
collusion with traditional American mafia families." 
Contrary to the SVR's stated commitments of cooperation with 
the West in fighting the international OC problem, it has 
only cooperated in order to leam what evidence U.S. 
officials have uncovered of Russian OC activity. As Louise 
Shelley pointed out, when a Russian delegation met with U.S. 
authorities to discuss evidence gained through wiretaps, 
(which remained in place), upon the delegates' return to 
Russia, the stream of information being thereby acquired 
emruptly ended."
In another exemple of Russian OC collaboration with 
other OC groups, ties between Russian OC and Mexican mafia 
members can be inferred to exist from the recent January 
1997 Justice Department indictment of 15 people in a freon 
smuggling operation. According to George Weise,
Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, "There are 
indications of major smuggling operations in Texas [and] 
California, some of which involve Russian OC and are 
transcontinental in scope."®®
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Officials say that the product has been smuggled into 
the U.S. along the same routes used by major drug 
traffickers. Evidently, one identified source of the 
smuggled freon is Russia, where its transfer originates.
The product is later shipped through Mexico and Canada to 
America.®^
Weise said that there had been a "dramatic shift in 
smuggling from Miami to Mexico and, further, that some of 
the bigger smuggling rings appear to involve Russiam OC.®® 
There appears to be collusion between Russian OC amd the 
Mexicam mafia here, which probably extends into other 
spheres, such as drug trafficking, as well.
Emigres
The Russian secret police have historically monitored 
emigres. Upon the Soviet Union's demise, travel amd 
emigration outside Russia's borders opened up on am 
unprecedented scale. Even so, the KGB's successors 
continued to monitor the movements of Russian citizens and, 
in a more recent twist, began to work with organized 
criminals to maintain watch on emigre activities. In 
Germany, authorities have evidence that Russian OC groups 
have built a base in Berlin and use it as a place to invest 
money obtained illegally amd, further, extort money from the 
Russian emigre entrepreneurs there.®®
There is also cooperation between Russian OC and the 
KGB's successor agencies in the trafficking of Russian
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emigre women. According to a source in Moscow, prostitutes 
are not controlled by OC within Russia. However, the 
"organizatsiya" controls every woman "the moment she goes 
abroad." And many of these women illegally enter the 
United States through Mexico, the destination for which they 
possessed tourist visas. Russiem OC provides the "roof" for 
those individuals who are involved in this flesh- 
trafficking. A director of a Moscow security firm, selling 
its service of providing protection, or krysha, (literally, 
a "roof") made the point, "We collaborate very closely with 
the police and the FSB [successor to the KGB]. Therefore we 
don't have problems. And we do not have any problems with 
criminal groups."®®
Within the U.S., the Brighton Beach area in New York 
City is one of the major areas where these activities 
occur.®® Russian organized criminals regularly extort the 
emigres, who further, are enticed to work with Russian 
intelligence. The situation is creating em increasingly 
difficult problem for U.S. law enforcement authorities who 
are fighting the new and ugly menace of Russian OC and, 
further, must monitor its relationship with the KGB's 
successor agencies, particularly the SVR.
Indeed, Russian OC in America has been posing an 
increasingly greater threat (to the growing concern of FBI 
and U.S. law enforcement agencies, among others) as it 
becomes entrenched in major American cities and its power
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emd influence outside Russia's borders continues to spread. 
For example, one notorious criminal, "vory-v-zakone" 
Vyacheslav Kirillovich Ivankov, vas released early from 
Soviet prison (in 1991) only to emigrate to New York City to 
run a leading Russian mafia group there.
In 1994, FBI officials believed that Ivankov's mission 
was to oversee and enlarge operations involving emigre 
activities in the U.S. and gangsters in Russia.^® U.S. 
Customs Agent Joel Campanella indicated that Ivankov was 
sent to coordinate gangster activity between Russia and 
North America.^® It was not until 1995 however, that 
Ivankov was convicted of masterminding a $3.5 million 
extortion scheme in Brooklyn, New York. To illustrate the 
cold-blooded and bold nature of Russian OC, for example, 
according to Newsweek, law enforcement officials have 
discovered that a former KGB assassin has a contract from 
the Russian mafia to teüce out two of the New York-based FBI 
agents who helped to ensnare Ivankov."
In 1995, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh had clearly 
recognized the threat, identifying Russian OC groups as "a 
new transnational enemy, one which is very powerful, very 
mobile, and very well supported around the world.""
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CHAPTER 6 
SPIES AND NETWORKS 
Spying
Spying is "the second oldest profession." Indeed, as 
Polmar and Allen noted, the second and first professions 
have a lot in common: they both involve "money, secrecy, 
sex, great public interest, and people's reputations - - or 
lack thereof."1 Moreover, every sovereign state has an 
intelligence service which, as its main function, recruits 
people to engage in espionage. As Cooper and Redlinger 
note, there are two kinds of spies: spies in place and 
trained spies.^ While spies in place already have access to 
information and simply need to be persuaded (accomplished by 
various methods) to transfer it, trained spies are em 
investment and are taught how to get in and get the 
information themselves. Since, as Polmar and Allen further 
note, "Governments seek secret information to eliminate 
uncertainty in the conducting of foreign affairs or to gain 
an advantage over other countries, the maintenance of 
espionage networks by governments world-wide is considered 
to be of the utmost importance.
118
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The Russians are old hands at the "Great Game."
Russia's political leaders have historically perceived 
neighboring states as posing a great threat to their rule. 
Thus, geographic territory, resources, culture, people, and 
other factors that constitute this "threat" can be 
conveniently used to blame foreign governments and 
intelligence services for the poor conditions resulting from 
the regime's misteücen and failed policies and its endemic 
corruption. So, too, this threat can be given as the reason 
why foreign countries must be closely watched in order to 
glean information on their affairs. Therefore, Russian 
intelligence services have remained vigilant in the task of 
assessing foreign states' capabilities and intentions 
through the use of spies. Former CIA Director Richard Helms 
made the point when he remarked that "Spying is part of the 
Russian nature. They were up to it all the time under the 
czars. It will take much more than one little collapse of 
the Soviet Union to expunge it from the Russian psyche.
A spy, according to Merriam-webster is, "one who keeps 
"secret" watch on a person or thing to obtain information" 
(author's italics added),^ "secret" being the key word here. 
In the book, Sp v Book; The Encyclopedia of Espionage, a spy 
is defined as "A person employed by a government or other 
entity to obtain "secret" information or intelligence about 
another, usually hostile, entity" (author's italics added).* 
Secrecy, again, describes the very essence of spying. In
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line with the imperative of secrecy in espionage, in order 
to conceal their true identification and purpose, spies 
traditionally have adopted a "cover," and a "legend" to 
compliment that cover. Of course, this practice remains the 
current trend.
In August 1992, following the post-Soviet Union 
restructuring of the Russian security and intelligence 
services, a new "Law on Foreign Intelligence" had been 
passed. One section of this law states that "career 
personnel may occupy positions in ministries, departments, 
establishments, enterprises, and organizations in accordance 
with the requirements of this law without compromising their 
association with foreign intelligence agencies."’ Further, 
it reads, "career personnel of foreign intelligence agencies 
may not occupy other salaried positions unless this is a 
professional necessity."®
If this law means anything, it codifies the "legal" 
right of em intelligence officer to take any position 
whatsoever in order to accomplish his goals. Therefore, one 
can assume that when Russian officials claim they do not use 
certain covers anymore, i.e. journalistic cover (Primakov 
claimed soon after being appointed head of foreign 
intelligence in January 1996 that the practice of 
intelligence officers using journalistic cover would most 
certainly cease),® they can be assumed to be lying.
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Evidence directly contradicting Primakov's statement 
has since surfaced. Indeed, in June 1996, it was reported 
that large numbers of SVR officers were stationed at the 
Moscow headquarters of Itar-Tass, the Russian news agency, 
waiting for their tour abroad to begin. Further, the report 
indicated that the Tass bureau in New York had two SVR 
spaces, one of which was already filled. Furthermore, the 
report described these "journalists" primary responsibility 
as the collection of political information, mainly 
operations intelligence (OSINT), émd the recruitment of 
agents. Additionally, the report noted that the SVR runs 
its human assets in the Russian language newspapers that are 
published in the United States.’®
In the post-communist world, the SVR continues to 
operate under many of the traditional covers used by former 
KGB officers. These covers can be separated into official 
and non-official cover. Within the official cover category, 
SVR officers land on American shores as "Foreign Ministry" 
employees, diplomats. Trade Ministry representatives, etc.. 
These operatives work within embassy and consulate walls and 
enjoy diplomatic immunity. If they are "caught in the act 
of spying," they are merely ordered to leave the host 
country on the basis of their "engaging in activities not 
compatible with their official diplomatic duties; they are 
declared persona non grata and expelled.
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Those operatives working under non-official covers, (or 
"illegal" status), and assuming the popular commercial cover 
of "businessmen" and partners, or academicians, students, 
journalists, etc., who are discovered spying receive no such 
niceties. They face torture, long prison terms, and, often, 
death. SVR officers assume all of the eüaove-mentioned 
covers. Additionally, there are many "sleeper" agents who 
have ensconced themselves deeply within Western society and 
have not yet been identified.
The controversy over using journalistic cover arises 
from the fact that open and free democracies provide factual 
and objective information to their people. There is a "free 
exchange of ideas," including opposing ideas. The Russian 
government, however, practices no such distribution of 
information. Instead, there is heavy censorship. Indeed, 
the dissemination of propaganda by strictly-controlled 
procedures continues in "democratic" Russia. Active 
measures and agents of influence continue to be utilized 
through the "new and democratic" press, which is 
increasingly being bought up and operated by Russian banking 
and business elites, many who have been associated with OC, 
and who use the media to further their own interests and to 
gain political influence.” Indeed, these entities, in 
part, comprise the "new oligarchy" and, as such, closely 
collcüDorate with the Russian intelligence services.
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One notable difference in chekist behavior, as 
previously discussed, is that former KGB officers now 
advertise their intelligence status and affiliation to the 
benefit of their personal commercial interests. However, it 
is important to note that this overt demonstration of 
espionage career occurs only on the domestic front; Russian 
foreign intelligence officers do no such thing. Naturally, 
SVR officers prefer to remain anonymous and free from 
surveillance so that they may actively attempt to recruit 
and handle agents, and so that they ceui set up and run spy 
networks undetected.
Recruiting Methods
The Russian intelligence service has a long history of 
using threat and force to recruit its spies. On the 
domestic front, families, careers, and even lives had been 
threatened for failure to comply with the demands of the 
Soviet secret police. Indeed, the informer society that was 
created, particularly during the Stalin era, was a result of 
this sort of intimidation and punishment. If the KGB 
selected a certain Russian national to work at, for example, 
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and to perform specific tasks, 
such as attempting to seduce one of the Marine Guards in 
order to gain access to the embassy in order to plant 
listening devices, or to work as a janitor, cleaning out 
trash cans, and, then reporting all information gleaned and 
activity observed to the KGB after work every day, then that
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particular individual did so. Otherwise, they paid, and 
they paid dearly. As such, fear was the great motivator, 
since communism's collapse, however, as human rights 
activist Boris Pustitsev notes, "They aren't as omnipotent 
as they were, but they still have the ability to create 
fear."”
In keeping with its new image as " law-abiding, 
"democratic," and recognizing civil rights,” in mid-1992,
SVR public relations spokesman (and former head of the KGB's 
Department S (illegals) ) Lt. Gen. Vadim Kirpichenko claimed 
that in the recruitment of agents, "uncivilized methods" 
were no longer permitted in the SVR. Instead, spy 
recruitment would be achieved by "finding people who 
themselves want to help us voluntarily, whether for money or 
out of love for Russia. Furthermore, Kirpichenko 
advocated the rejection of the use of drugs and other 
coercive means to recruit spies.’*
In so many words, Kirpichenko was trying to convey that 
Russian intelligence no longer employs its traditional 
tactics; however, his statements could easily be read as 
demonstrating his awareness that most individuals that 
decide to betray their country volunteer their services on 
their own. Moreover, Kirpichenko's statement on "love for 
Russia" may well imply the SVR's use of "sexpionage" tactics 
to compromise individuals and/or blackmail them into spying 
for Russia. This technique is an old KGB favorite.
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As David Levis observed in his examination of the KGB's 
treatment of sex as an intelligence tool in his book, 
Sexpionage;-The Exploitation..of Sex by Soviet.Intelligence, 
the KGB places great importance on the perfection of 
seducing techniques to be employed by both male agents 
("Ravens") and female agents ("Swallows") to accommodate 
and, later, exploit the target's sexual preferences,’* 
particularly if the target engages in "deviant" sex.
During the cold war, the KGB had recruited people to 
spy for Russia on usually either an ideological basis or on 
a financial basis. Occasionally, blackmail was the key 
mechanism employed. Now, ideology is dead and Russia is 
very short on cash. To overcome these barriers to 
recruitment, other methods have been implemented. Former 
KGB officer Yuri Shvets has claimed that while in training 
at the Intelligence Academy in Russia, he was told by his 
masters to use psychology, since "only psychology is 
left."” Indeed, psychology can be a powerful tool when 
used correctly. Nevertheless, the KGB's successors continue 
many of their traditional recruiting tactics; however, these 
methods have been modified in some cases.
To lower its costs and increase its protection from 
foreign counterintelligence. Third World Countries (TWCs) 
are increasingly being used as recruiting and meeting sites, 
(in addition to other purposes) by Russian intelligence 
officers. This is not to say that the U.S. and Western
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Europe are no longer prime espionage sites. However, in 
TWCs, foreign counterintelligence surveillamce is at a 
reduced level. Instead, each host government's behavior is 
a larger factor, as are the host government's relations with 
Russia. Naturally, where the "anti-Russiam" 
counterintelligence presence is low, KGB-SVR officers 
probably feel safer in meeting in person with their agents. 
Indeed, the political climate remains a significant factor 
in determining which communication methods will be employed. 
For exemple, in communicating with agents in certain "more 
secure" environments, SVR officers may employ the brush pass 
method. However, within the U.S., particularly in the 
Washington and New York areas where a strong FBI presence 
exists, deaddrops are the preferred method of communication 
between SVR officers and their agents.
A review of past spy cases reveals a recent switch in 
tactics by SVR-KGB recruiters. The SVR has increasingly 
been using TWCs, rather than the U.S., as a preferred 
recruiting ground, particularly in recruiting and handling 
Americans. There are two basic reasons for this change in 
operational method. First of all, the cost is less, often 
considerably less. As communism collapsed, the Russian 
intelligence services, both domestic and foreign, faced a 
cash crunch. This reality forced the SVR to modify its 
procedures while still attempting to remain effective. 
Confronted with an intelligence budget reduction, SVR-head
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Primeücov had to find more efficient ways to run the damaged 
spy orggmization.
The costs of living and operating in TWCs are simply 
less than those incurred by residing in the Western 
industrialized countries. Moreover, the increased 
porousness of numerous borders following communism's demise 
led memy Americans to travel to the FSU amd the newly-opened 
societies of Eastern Europe. As such, as many Russiams 
aptly state, why not just let the Americans come to them? 
They have a point, for the Russian intelligence services 
could thereby minimize their travel amd operating costs. 
Furthermore, the foreign counterintelligence presence in 
Russia, and particularly in Moscow, is greatly reduced in 
terms of both numbers and effectiveness, while Russian 
counterintelligence (FSB) is in great supply. Indeed, the 
difficulties of conducting espionage in Russia are such that 
foreign case officers communicate with their agents almost 
exclusively through deaddrops, rarely, if ever, meeting with 
them in person.”
The second reason that Russian foreign intelligence 
officers prefer to operate, specifically to recruit, in TWCs 
is the reduced foreign counterintelligence threat there. 
Indeed, any counterintelligence presence (of the U.S. or its 
close allies) that may benefit the Americans is greatly 
wanting in many TWCs today. Furthermore, many existing 
governments of TWCs make it difficult, if not impossible.
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for the U.S. to establish either a counterintelligence 
presence or aaiy effective spy network for that matter, 
within their borders, which, by contrast, enables the 
Russiem intelligence apparatus to more easily establish its 
networks there. For example, the CIA's eüsility to operate 
in many Arab countries is seriously lacking, which forces 
the Americans to rely on the Mossad for intelligence on Araüo 
and Middle Eastern state security organization activities 
and terrorists movements, as well as information regarding 
the interaction of these groups with the Russian 
intelligence services.
Spies 
Aldrich Ames
Contrary to claims that the KGB had collapsed right 
along with communism, Russiem intelligence operations in the 
U.S. continued virtually unad)ated. It had only been days 
after the MB was reneuned the FSK, on February, 21, 1994, 
that 53-year old CIA officer Aldrich Ames, who had been 
spying for Russia since 1985, was arrested by the FBI for 
espionage.” His arrest was the result of an investigation 
that had been formally opened on May 12, 1993 by the FBI's 
Washington Field Office.^®
The fact that his Soviet-Russian handlers had continued 
to operate virtually uninterrupted even as communism 
collapsed and the KGB "was no more" is one exemple 
evidencing the fact that KGB networks continued to operate
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within the U.S. as the Soviet Union's landscape transformed 
into several new, independent states. To be sure, the KGB's 
successors continue to run "Soviet" agents emd to prioritize 
the penetration of foreign intelligence services, 
particularly those of, and working within, the 
industrialized nations.
In his book. Killer Spy. Peter Naas described Ames' 
activities during the nine years that he spied for Soviet- 
Russia. He noted that Ames continued to meüce his annual 
meetings with his KGB-SVR hamdlers in Latin America euid 
continued to service deaddrops in the Washington area 
throughout the era when tumultuous changes were occurring in 
Russia as communism collapsed and numerous Soviet 
institutions crumbled. Actually, there was absolutely no 
interruption in the KGB-SVR running of Ames except for one 
change in handlers ("Andrei" replaced "Vlad") in Caracas at 
an October 1992 meeting. At this meeting, to complement the 
new relationship, there had been one variation made in 
procedure: Ames was given new signal sites by his new 
handler.^’
Even as the KGB was "dismantled," foreign intelligence 
was made autonomous from all other Russian security and 
intelligence seirvices, and each of the new Russian 
intelligence organizations faced major budget constraints, 
Ames continued to be paid. Indeed, Ames was the "highest 
paid spy in the history of the world. He actually
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received $2.7 million from Moscow emd was promised $1.9 
million more, for a total of $4.6 million.
During his nine years of spying, Ames gave the Russians 
information on U.S. counterintelligence activities, agent 
hemdling methods, collection activities, analytic 
techniques, communication methods, and other tradecraft. 
Furthermore, Ames gave the Russians a wealth of information 
on double agent operations and agent validation methods.^* 
The KGB-SVR then used this information to double many 
agents and, hence, feed disinformation back to the CIA for 
transfer to U.S. intelligence consumers, including the 
president.^'’ Evidently, with Ames' invalueüale assistance, 
from 1987 to 1991, when the CIA discovered the operation due 
to poor tradecraft on the Russian side, the KGB successfully 
operated a large network of double agents against U.S. 
intelligence. "*
This network was operated under the direction of KGB 
counterintelligence (SCD) and the KGB FCD-SVR. However, 
according to the CIA's damage assessment report, only some 
of its informants had been betrayed by Ames and forced to 
double (by Russiem intelligence); others had been created by 
the KGB simply to confuse the Americans. In hindsight,
Los Angeles Times reporter Jêmes Risen aptly observed the 
situation: "Ames gave the KGB a veritable road map to the 
CIA's Soviet espionage networks, allowing them to turn those 
networks back against the United States in the late 1980s
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and early 1990s.” To what extent U.S. perceptions of 
Moscow and its foreign and defense policy objectives, among 
other things, were manipulated, remains unclear.”
While the Senate and House Intelligence Committees' 
damage assessments concluded that Ames compromised more them 
100 foreign agents or prospective agents,^® in the CIA's 
general deunage assessment, the DCI reported (in December 
1995) that Ames' espionage "caused severe wide-ranging and 
continuing deunage to U.S. national security interests" 
including exposing the identity of numerous U.S. 
intelligence assets operating against the Soviet-Russians” 
at least ten of which were executed.
Many questions have been raised as to whether Ames 
compromised Fred Woodruff, a U.S. official who had been 
working out of the U.S. Embassy in Tblisi, Georgia in 1993 
when Ames traveled there. Ames had known Woodruff years 
before in Virginia*’ and, hence, could have identified him 
as a CIA officer. Investigators noted that Ames' visit had 
been less than one month before Woodruff was killed by an 
AK-47 bullet to the head as he was traveling in a jeep with 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's personal security 
chief. Col. Eldar Gogoladze.”
Amy Knight noted that former Georgian Security Minister 
Igor Giorgadze, a protege of SVR-chief Primakov, had offered 
Georgian security officers free training in Moscow.**
However, since Woodruff had been helping Gogoladze train
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Georgiem state security forces, one could speculate that 
Giorgadze asked Primakov to have the SVR kill Woodruff, 
possibly because Woodruff vas training Gogoladze's Georgiem 
security service troops emd, hence, posed a competition and, 
hence, a threat to Giorgadze*s interests.
However, others have speculated that Woodruff was 
killed by the SVR because he had somehow discovered that 
Ames was spying for Moscow.” Could Woodruff possibly have 
learned Ames was a spy through Giorgadze or Gogoladze? In 
an added twist to the mystery, a Segodnya newspaper report 
indicated that Georgian Security Minister Shota Kviraya had 
accused his predecessor, Giorgadze, of arranging the killing 
on Moscow's orders. Furthermore, Kviraya had accused 
Gogoladze and another Russian agent posing as a Georgian 
businessman of also being in on the plot.** Naturally, a 
spokesman for Russian security services, Yuri Kobaladze, 
denied KGB involvement in the killing, stating that the 
Russian intelligence service "is not involved in terrorism - 
- it fights against terrorism, together with other 
countries, including the United States."** To close the 
(Woodruff) case, Russian authorities arrested a man, who 
"admitted to the crime," was convicted, and received a 15- 
year prison sentence for the killing. Since no evidence 
linking Ames with the killing has been found, whether Ames 
was involved in Woodruff's death remains a mystery.*’
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Harold Nicholson 
Ames' arrest was followed not quite two years later, on 
November 16, 1996, by U.S. federal agents' arrest of 46-yr 
old, 16-year veteran CIA officer Harold Nicholson.” One of 
the new counterintelligence tools gained by FBI 
counterintelligence officials in the wake of the Ames 
scandal was the authority to search suspects' financial 
records. Thus, Nicholson's espionage was discovered. 
Following the FBI's deeper investigation of Nicholson's 
financial records, it was determined most likely that 
Nicholson's first payment from the Russians for spying had 
been received in the eunount of $12,000 on June 30, 1994.*® 
Hence, Nicholson is believed to have spied for the Russians 
since at least 1994, or eüaout the time of Ames' arrest.
While Ames was the most-damaging CIA officer ever 
charged with spying for Moscow, Nicholson was the highest- 
ranking. Nicholson allegedly began his spying after he was 
transferred from his post as Chief of Station (COS) in 
Bucharest, Romania, which he had held from 1990-92 and where 
his marriage had collapsed, and situated himself in his new 
posting as deputy COS in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.^®
Upon the end of Nicholson's tour duty in Romania in 
June 1992, he and his wife of 21 years had returned to the 
U.S., where she filed for divorce.^’ As such, then, while 
he was posted in Malaysia, Nicholson had been preoccupied 
with a bitter divorce and custody battle. Faced with
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mounting expenses and becoming increasingly emotionally 
unsteüale, Nicholson was a vulnerable target for recruitment 
by foreign intelligence services.
FBI and CIA officials believe Nicholson started his 
spying in June 1994 after his fourth meeting with an 
official at the Russian embassy in Kuala Lumpur, where he 
was deputy COS. The meetings had been authorized by the 
COS. However, it could be speculated that Nicholson had 
been spotted, assessed, and marked for recruitment by the 
Russians while stationed in Romania, where he had likely 
been kept under close surveillance by Russian intelligence 
operatives. Moreover, the Russians were likely very aware 
of Nicholson's personal problems with his wife, which they 
could exploit.
As it happened, Nicholson's motive to betray his 
country and his agency was money, or rather greed, since he 
made a decent salary as it was. Investigators later found 
that Nicholson's spying had begun about the same time as his 
alimony payments, equaling 25% of his net salary, were set 
to begin.
During its investigation, the FBI had surveilled 
Nicholson when he went to Singapore, and where he had 
delivered a large batch of secrets to Russian intelligence 
officers. According to the FBI affidavit, Nicholson planned 
to meet his Russian handlers again in Switzerland on 
November 17, 1996. Five days prior to this scheduled
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meeting, on November 12, 1996, the concealed cameras in 
Nicholson's CIA office showed him kneeling under his desk 
photographing documents. However, FBI agents, disguised as 
airport ground crew workers, arrested Nicholson upon his 
lemding at Dulles International Airport en route to Zurich, 
Switzerland, where he was prepared to board a flight to meet 
his Russian hamdlers.
Interestingly, Nicholson had requested (and received) 
the camera that he had used to photograph documents from the 
CIA supply office.” Had the Russiems offered to provide 
their spy with a camera? Or were the Russians more "cost 
conscious" than they had been during the cold war, when they 
had provided expensive Minox cameras to their agents?
Following Nicholson's conviction for espionage on June 
5, 1997, he was sentenced to 23.7 years in federal prison.” 
In exchange for the short sentence, Nicholson agreed to 
cooperate with counterintelligence officials in determining 
the damage he had caused. Contrary to what U.S. 
investigators had previously believed, (that Nicholson had 
received $180,000 from Moscow), Nicholson actually received 
$300,000 from Moscow, which he had hidden away in Swiss bank 
accounts. **
Nicholson gave the Russian intelligence service a wide- 
ranging assortment of U.S. national security secrets and 
exposed both CIA sources and methods in the process. As an 
experienced intelligence officer, Nicholson had been given
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the job of training CIA recruits, which he did from 1994-96. 
Following his arrest, the most damaging secrets he provided 
the Russiems, which he admitted giving up, were the CIA 
recruits' identifications, biographies, and assignments, 
which had resulted in the Russians' learning new CIA agent 
covers.^* In other words, he gave the SVR information about 
future officers and their work in the CIA's deepest cover 
program.^’ As a result, U.S. intelligence on Russian 
espionage activities has been severely weeücened.
Nicholson's handlers used different methods of 
communication than those used by Ames' handlers, as 
discovered by FBI-CIA surveillance teams. Unlike Ames, 
Nicholson only operated overseas and never met with his 
Russian handlers within U.S. borders. And unlike Ames, who 
communicated with his handlers mainly through the use of 
signal sites amd deaddrops in the Washington D.C. area, 
Nicholson never communicated with his handlers through 
deaddrops. Instead, the methodology employed by Nicholson 
included (information) drops in foreign railway stations and 
he sent postcards with code words to a post office box 
overseas from foreign posts.However, in both cases, the 
FBI acquired pictures of the CIA turncoats face-to-face with 
Russian agents; both Ames and Nicholson were also observed 
by FBI agents clandestinely meeting in cars with Russian 
diplomatic plates.
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Earl Pitts
The FBI's recent arrest of 43-yr-old, 13-year FBI 
veteran Earl Edwin Pitts is yet another exemple of the 
continuing Russiem intelligence activity in the U.S.. Pitts 
was arrested following a 16-month investigation, on December 
18, 1996 at the FBI Academy in Quantico, where he was 
working at the time of his arrest. Pitts allegedly began 
spying for the Russians between 1987-89 while working on 
counterespionage operations in New York City.
According to the FBI affidavit, during that period, 
Pitts had access to information on counterintelligence 
investigations, including recruitment efforts and double 
agent operations involving Russian intelligence officers.*® 
Thus, Pitts' work made him a target for recruitment by 
Russian intelligence; however, Pitts volunteered his 
services.
Pitts first made contact with the KGB in July 1987 by 
writing a letter to a Russian, whom he mistakenly believed 
to be a KGB agent assigned to the UN's Soviet Mission. In 
the letter, Pitts sought to arrange a meeting with Soviet 
intelligence. *’ This Russian, in turn, introduced Pitts to 
the New York chief of KGB, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Karpov, at 
the New York Public Library.
Thereafter, for a period of five years, from 1987-92, 
Pitts made deaddrops of computer disks containing classified 
information including family information aUsout fellow FBI
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agents who might be vulnerable to recruitment as Russiam 
spies; he identified Russiam agents known to the FBI; gave 
details of his own assignment amd exposed the work of an FBI 
informant who "reported covertly on Russiam intelligence 
matters." Moreover, he offered to smuggle a Russian agent, 
who specialized in bugs, into the FBI Academy in Quantico, 
Virginia.
In the FBI's investigation of Pitts, it was discovered 
that the most damaging information he had given the KGB was 
the FBI's secret list, known as the "Soviet Administrative 
List," which is a computerized document that includes 
classified information gathered aUbout all Russian officials 
posted or assigned to the U.S., and the U.S. agents assigned 
to gather that information.*^
In 1992, Pitts ceased his spying; as Los Angeles Times 
reporter James Risen noted, Pitts had probaüsly outlived his 
usefulness, and in light of diminished Russian intelligence 
resources, had been abandoned by the Russians three years 
after his August 1989 transfer to FBI Headquarters in 
Washington. ** A year later, when a security breach had been 
discovered in the FBI's New York office where Pitts had 
worked, his name was placed on the circulated list of 
potential traitors. And, then, in an ironic twist, between 
1993-95 during the FBI's search for the penetration, Pitts' 
initial Russian contact was successfully recruited by FBI 
agents. This Russian defector exposed Pitts' spying.
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Hence, contact with Pitts was made in an FBI sting operation 
to "renew the relationship."
The turned Russian agent and an FBI agent posed as 
Pitts' new Russian handlers and "restored" the relationship, 
leading Pitts to incriminate himself on numerous occasions 
as the FBI built its case against him. Indeed, during the 
16-month sting operation, Pitts made 22 drops at Mailboxes 
Etc., Box 318, unknowingly informing his undercover 
colleagues by beeper each time he intended to make a drop, 
he also had nine telephone conversations with his 
"handlers," and met them in person twice.
Throughout the duration of the operation, Pitts gave 
the FBI his plans on how to smuggle a Russian intelligence 
technical expert into the FBI Academy, he provided the 
agents with a key to the FBI Academy, provided a special FBI 
telecommunications device used to transmit classified 
material, and made available his own FBI identification 
badge, most likely so the Russians could counterfeit their 
own badges. To top the whole charade off, Pitts kept an 
"escape plan" on his CIA office computer.**
Money was the motivation for Pitts' spying, also.
During his five years of spying for Russia, he is believed 
to have actually received $124,224.66 from Moscow, plus he 
had been promised $100,000 more, (which was being held for 
him in Moscow), for a total of $224,224.66.**
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Eastern European Networks and Political Espionage 
During the cold war, the security emd intelligence 
services of the Eastern European countries were simply 
surrogates of the Soviet KGB. They followed the orders of 
Moscow 2uid received their instructions from Moscow. For 
example, KGB "advisors” were present at all (Czech 
intelligence service, StB) staff levels and cleared all 
intelligence plans and operations. Indeed, according to 
Czech defector Ladislav Bittmam, this procedure took place 
on a daily basis.*’
As the new, quasi-democratic governments of these 
countries set out to build democratic institutions and 
develop legal norms and a judicial system built on the rule 
of law, they also sought to reform the security services - - 
a daunting task. Many of these new security services 
retained their former communist party personnel, which made 
reform very difficult.*® Moreover, informant networks 
remained somewhat intact because of the existence of secret 
police files. Hence, KGB-SVR officers continued to control 
many informants, particularly those who had gained political 
or powerful positions in communism's wake. The fear of 
exposure as Soviet spies ensured their continued cooperation 
and service.
Even so, communism's collapse still Owreaked havocO on 
Moscow's spy network abroad.*® The loss of ideological 
mission that accompanied communism's demise had resulted in
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the KGB-FCD's loss of some of its Soviet agents working 
within the Eastern European states. As SVR first deputy 
director Vyacheslav Trubnikov stated in 1995, "We really 
have lost that part of our network - the hardest working 
part - that cooperated with us on an ideological basis.
These were people who believed in the ideals of socialism, 
in the USSR."*®
Increasingly, the old chekists from the cold war period 
are leaving the security and intelligence services or 
retiring, emd new officers are replacing them. It will take 
time for the KGB's influence and repressive techniques to be 
phased out of East European intelligence services as the new 
democracies replace the old communist regimes. The 
widespread crime and corruption that has experienced 
explosive growth throughout Eastern Europe since communism's 
collapse has promoted the survival of Soviet-style secret 
police activity. The major impediment to reform is that the 
secret police of these states, like those of the FSU, are 
widely corrupt and in colleUsoration with OC, which 
exacerbates the political-economic-social insteüsility of 
many of these countries.
The Russian foreign intelligence service has been 
working to rebuild its fragmented espionage networks within 
Eastern Europe and regain the tremendous influence it had 
enjoyed, achieved through its predecessors' unsparing and
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brutal application of force, and, thus, control over the 
Soviet Union's satellite states.
However, the situation in these states dreunatically 
changed upon communism's demise. Travel restrictions were 
lifted and these peoples gained much greater access to 
information. Also, in many of these Eastern European 
states, Internet access has become ubiquitous. Within the 
intelligence sector,, each state restructured its 
intelligence service, and to some extent, in light of the 
newly-gained freedoms and the overwhelming public opinion 
demands that these newly-gained rights be recognized and 
supported by the authorities, state security cibuse has been 
reduced.
Nevertheless, the secret police presence, surviving off 
of its well-developed informant network from the Soviet era, 
still exists. Ineviteüsly, many KGB informants that remain 
cooperative following these states' gaining of independence 
from Moscow do so because they can not break with their 
past. Indeed, the KGB-SVR maintains detailed files on each 
informant and, the fear of exposure and the retribution that 
would likely follow in the form of loss of career, or worse, 
in addition to the pressure the SVR surely continues to 
apply on these informants to continue to spy, has enadaled 
the SVR to retain some influence over events there.
Indeed, as Louise Shelley notes in her recent book. 
Policing Soviet Society: The evolution of state control, the
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former KGB's effect on the present amd future state of 
police and state security organizations in Eastern Europe 
will take many years to eradicate even as these states 
struggle to democratize. Shelley stated that, "by 
perpetuating the power of the state at the expense of the 
rights of individual citizens, the traditions of Soviet 
policing will impede democratization in many of these 
[Eastern European] nations for years to come.
Since the newly-independent Baltics refused to join the 
CIS, they are treated by the SVR as any other foreign state. 
In short, these countries are well-seeded with SVR agents. 
Moreover, the SVR has the benefit of its KGB predecessors' 
work in these states: the informant network and the 
intelligence services' files (to force cooperation) are 
well-developed and remain in place.^ So, too, it is most 
likely, many sleeper agents and illegals remain in place.
Unlike the CIS member republics, since gaining 
independence in 1991, all three Baltic state governments 
have passed laws that enable prosecutors to arrest former 
KGB agents suspected of persecuting the Baltic peoples 
during the Soviet era. And many officials that collaborated 
with Moscow have indeed been sentenced under the laws to 
years in prison.“
In the post-cold war world, many former Soviet spies 
residing and operating in Eastern Europe have gone into 
private business, while they doubtless maintain their
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intelligence contacts. Others, rarely being paid or no 
longer on the payroll of the Russian government, have likely 
sold their services to OC groups amd foreign intelligence 
services. Nevertheless, many remain entrenched in the same 
intelligence organizations of which they have worked for 
years.
As Amy Knight noted, the collapse of the KGB's Eastern 
European espionage networks greatly impeded its ability to 
glean information on NATO member activities.^ Not only did 
the KGB-SVR maintain contact with its informants throughout 
the collapse of communism, but, more importantly, it 
"established an underground network throughout Eastern 
Europe"®^ under Primakov's direction.
There is no doubt that a widespread and well-built 
sleeper network exists throughout Eastern Europe. Surely, 
as these newly-independent countries become NATO members in 
NATO's expansion eastward, the Russian intelligence services 
will be working toward better developing their espionage 
networks there. As Western influence and power, projected 
through NATO, have extended eastward, the SVR has been 
attempting to infiltrate the political institutions of these 
(former Soviet satellite) states in order to thwart 
U.S./NATO foreign and defense policy goals.
The Russians' concern over NATO expansion has been 
expressed at many levels. From the intelligence sector, a 
spokeswoman reported in September 1995 that the SVR would be
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monitoring NATO expansion closely.®® That seune month, the 
Czech Republic's Federal Security and Information Service 
(FBIS), in its 1995 annual repoxrt, claimed that Russian 
intelligence had initiated a campaign to hinder the Czech 
Republic's entrance into NATO. Furthermore, the FBIS 
reports showed estimates of around 400 Russian agents 
operating within the country, 56 of which were accredited 
diplomats. ®^
The spy scandal that erupted as Poland prepared to hold 
its November 1995 presidential elections brought the 
memories of the interference in Polish affairs and the 
atrocities committed against the Poles by Soviet 
intelligence back to the forefront of the Polish peoples' 
minds. Poland has had to overcome many barriers in its 
attempts to end its repressive system, rid itself of Soviet 
influence, and break with its past. Part of Poland's effort 
at democratization was the recent holding of free elections.
During these elections, the Soviet-Russian intelligence 
services involvement in Poland's political affairs became 
evident. The accusation that newly-elected (November 1996) 
former communist president Aleksander Kwasniewski's newly- 
appointed Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy was a Soviet spy and 
had spied for Moscow from the early 1980s until 1995®® was 
made by former Solidarity leader and Polish President Lech 
Walesa's Interior Minister Andrzej Mikzanowsk.®® These 
accusations ultimately led to Oleksy's resignation in late
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Jamuary 1996. ° Oleksy emphatically declared himself 
innocent of the charges, claiming that his 13-year 
"neighborly relationships" with Soviet-Russian intelligence 
agents were simply harmless friendships.^^
In the mix-up that followed the spying allegations, 
Oleksy fired Dep. Interior Minister Henryk Jasik, who had 
supervised the inquiry into Oleksy's alleged espionage, 
replacing him with former dissident surveiller and communist 
partner, Jerzy Konieczny. Poland's counterintelligence 
chief then quit in protest.Clearly, the activities of 
the KGB-SVR in trying to thwart Poland's attempts at reform 
and democracy pose a continuing threat to Polish 
independence from negative Russian influence.
As the East European states struggle to build 
democratic institutions and break their former relationship 
with the Soviet secret police, SVR interference will pose a 
continuing threat to political stability in each country. 
Even so, the membership of the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Hungary into NATO moved closer to reality with the May 27, 
1997 signing of the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co­
operation and Security" in Paris by Yeltsin and NATO's 16 
heads of government, (to be followed up with a Madrid summit 
meeting on July 8, 1997 with the same leaders to start talks
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
on [alliance] enlargement^^ and, additionally, to announce 
the new NATO members)
In Romania, recently elected (November 1996)^^
President Emil Constantinuescu has begun a forceful campaign 
to eradicate corruption euid collaUaoration between political 
leaders, organized criminals, and the secret police. An 
effective corruption commission was created emd has been 
seeking to completely crush Romania's "public-private 
mafias." Indeed, many corrupt bankers, politicians, and 
powerful criminals have been jailed. Moreover, since 
Constantinescu took office in January 1997, with as one of 
his aims the creation of a truly independent judiciary, the 
national police force has removed one-fourth of its county 
chiefs. Police chief Pavel Abrahem stated that, "We're 
finished with mystery and secrecy. " ® And in May 1997, the 
long-serving chief of Romemia's intelligence service was 
forced out. It appears Constantinescu's drive for a 
democratic Romania may ultimately be successful since 
efforts at confidence-building measures, such as the 
development of institutions that the cynical mass public can 
trust, are progressing.
The Founding Act sets up a permanent NATO-Russia joint 
council that will meet monthly and operate on the 
"consensus" principle, however, Russia has no veto power. 
Further, this council will outline Russian-NATO agreement 
cooperation on security matters vis-a-vis the former Warsaw 
Pact states, particularly involving weapons and troop levels 
on new states.
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The current situation in Bulgaria is conducive to the 
development of OC, terrorist, smd secret police 
relationships, in antagonism to law and freedom. Bulgaria 
has long been a center of "Soviet-inspired" espionage emd 
has served as the base for one of Eastern Europe ' s "most 
sinister" secret police organizations. Throughout the cold 
war, Bulgarian agents were implicated in numerous plots, 
many in cooperation with the Soviet K6B.^^ And since 
communism's demise, the country has been plagued by high- 
level corruption and a multitude of extortion rackets, which 
are widely believed to have political connections.
In October 1996 Bulgaria's first post-communist Prime 
Minister, Andrei Lukanov, served for one year before he was 
shot dead in front of his apartment building by a "hobo" 
armed with a Russian-made automatic pistol. Many government 
members and other diplomats suspect that Russian 00 was 
responsible for the killing, since Lukanov was heavily 
involved in JVs with Russian groups. Or, it is suspected 
that Lukanov's death was political murder, since Lukanov had 
recently had a falling out with his Russian partners on an 
oil deal that had many political implications. ® Either 
scenario points to Russian intelligence involvement.
Serbia has become a bastion for organized criminals. 
Iranian and Colombian drug smugglers now use it as a 
preferred smuggling route to Europe. One individual 
handling government-private contracts commented that.
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"bribes are flowing in here like water" as OC groups 
position themselves to teüce government contracts and to buy 
up state-owned business.
Moreover, prostitution, fueled by the demand that the 
53,000 NATO-led peace-keeping force presents, is reunpant. 
Organized criminals often control the sex rings, chemneling 
the proceeds to support their arms-trafficking ventures, 
which are themselves highly profitcü>le in light of the 
numerous ethnic conflicts raging throughout the region. The 
situation is exacerbated by the fact that, in meuiy cases, 
the police are closely intertwined with the criminal 
networks. ® As such, OC activity in the region thrives.
Serbia has also become a bastion for spies. In 
February 1997, Time reported that Serbian spymaster Jovica 
Stanisic controls an 80,000-strong police force and an 
"extensive network of spies".®® Another report compared 
1996 Sarajevo to the spy capitals of Vienna and Berlin 
during the cold war. The former Yugoslavia's internal 
strife is a scenario where multifarious external forces 
contribute to the turmoil, and some exploit it for personal 
gain or their own interests. Russian backing of the Serbs, 
along with Arab and Iranian support of the Muslims®^ has 
added fuel to the volatile situation in that country.®^
This situation has increased the potential for spillover 
into surrounding areas as the implicit issues there threaten 
to become more internationally significant.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
150
The seriousness of the East European crime situation 
has led to some cooperation between Western and Russiem law 
enforcement officials. For example, in May 1996, for the 
third consecutive year, police officials from five Western 
nations and Russia met in London to discuss the OC problem 
of Eastern European gangster activities.®^ However, 
Primakov's 1993 visits to many of these same Eastern 
European countries to reestablish relations between 
intelligence and security services emd to formalize 
coordination agreements on the basis of OC, drug and arms 
trafficking ®^demonstrates a continued close relationship 
between the Russian and East European intelligence services. 
Even so, Russian-East European tensions may likely develop 
and, further, increase when these former Warsaw Pact 
countries join NATO against Kremlin wishes. Surely, 
attempts to flush Soviet-Russ ian spies out of the new NATO 
members' security and intelligence services will coincide 
with these states' integration into any NATO arrangements 
with the West.
By contrast, the post-communist intelligence situation 
in East Germany was different than that of the remaining 
former Soviet and Soviet-bloc states. The release of the 
East German secret police (Stasi) files after the Berlin 
Wall fell resulted in the subsequent arrest and trial of 
numerous East German intelligence officials, including 
spymaster Marcus Wolf, who had headed the East German
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espionage apparatus (Stasi) from 1953-86.®^ Also known as 
"the man without the face," he had been charged repeatedly®® 
and spent a large part of his recent life fighting the 
Germem judicial process.
During the cold war, the Stasi had been one of the 
world's largest espionage services, with 85,000 agents, in 
the world. Drawing on KGB traditions, its agents had 
pervaded every aspect of East Germany, smd much of West 
German society. Indeed, in retrospect, one FBI official 
stated that, "The East Germans had the most extensive 
intelligence and spy network in the West and probably had 
West Germany penetrated more than any place on Earth."®^
Whatever happened to the 85,000 agents? Unlike the 
intelligence officers of the East European states, who faced 
"new" countries with new ideas, the East German intelligence 
service and East Germany became defunct in 1990. Hence, 
many of these Stasi agents either went underground or fled 
the country out of fear of prosecution. It is likely that 
many of them have sold their services to foreign 
intelligence services and international OC groups. Others 
remain as sleeper agents in the reunified Germany.
It is plausible to assume that since the KGB had 
exerted such great influence on the Stasi, and had worked so 
closely with the secret police agency, many of its (former) 
spies that remain within the German subterrain have 
maintained their links with the (former) KGB as a source of
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intelligence on the events taking place within reunified 
Germemy. Moreover, the collaboration in 1994 between the 
BND and SVR in plutonium smuggling is indicative of a new 
cmd friendly relationship between German and Russiam 
intelligence in the post-communist world.
The "Near Abroad" and Terrorism
When the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was 
created in December 1991, comprised of 12 of the 15 former 
Soviet republics (the Baltics refused to join), each 
republic gained its own independence. It is important to 
recognize that even though these republics became autonomous 
or sovereign states, they remained very dependent on Russia. 
This dependence was in the form of both economic and 
military (national security) needs.
The political-social environment in many of the 
republics is one where pluralities of nationalists and, 
hence, ethnic conflicts and civil wars rage as each nation 
seeks its own political dominance over the other competing 
ethnicities. During the Stalin era, the borders of these 
republics had been artificially drawn so as to foment this 
sort of volatile situation; Stalin's divide-and-rule 
policy,*® plus the total repression of these peoples by his 
NKVD, kept the ethnic hostilities under Center control and 
subject to strategic provocation by the secret police, 
which, in turn, fueled the fires of ethnic hatred in the
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dictator's efforts to distract the people from opposing his 
totalitariem rule.
When in 1991 the former Soviet republics became 
sovereign states, each of their governments could, in 
theory, create and control their own institutions, free from 
Kremlin control and interference. However, within the 
security and intelligence sector, many of the old Soviet KGB 
institutions were simply rensuned.
As previously noted, each republic had created its own 
KGB. However, this often eunounted to a simple facelift of 
the old organization. As Amy Knight pointed out, even 
though some former KGB officers, (specifically, those of 
Russian nationality) returned to Moscow, many of the native 
KGB staffers retained their positions in the newly-former 
republic intelligence apparatuses. Furthermore, these 
same native KGB staffers maintained their chekist ties with 
Moscow, which, moreover, continued to exert its influence in 
the republics through these chekists.
Since the Russian MSB (KGB successor agency created in 
the wake of the CIS' formation) had claimed the material and 
financial resources of the former Soviet republic KGB 
units*® immediately following the dissolution of the USSR, 
the new agencies that replaced them were (left) weak and 
disorganized. As Amy Knight notes, those personnel that had 
remained with the newly-created republic KGBs were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154
experienced in counterintelligence and domestic security, 
but lacked any foreign intelligence capabilities.
The Kremlin's strategic reasoning here was its 
intention on thereby placing the republic's security forces 
in a weakened state, and, hence, creating as much dependency 
as possible on their maintenance of old links with the 
Center to help ensure Moscow's control over the political 
stability or instability throughout the region. Thereby, 
Moscow could retain some control over events there, 
maintained through the utilization of Russian military 
troops, thousands of which remain based within (most of) the 
republics. Moreover, the Kremlin's arming and supporting of 
those forces that are pro-Moscow and pro-reintegration 
minded continues while, so, too, does intimidation of any 
opposition.
Former KGB FCD personnel either pulled out or they 
stayed and continued to work in the newly-created republic 
KGBs, but for the TsSR-SVR, rather than for the new 
republics' interests specifically. Moreover, SVR and top 
military officers, since they controlled Russia's weapons 
sector, supplied any groups to their choosing with 
(conventional) weapons of their choosing. As such, while 
keeping the republics in a state of civil war or turmoil, 
these officers additionally made large sums of cash on 
weapons deals. In her 1996 book. Spies Without Cloaks. Amy 
Knight accounts Russian media stories of just these sorts of
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trades.*^ Naturally, such deals involved corrupt officials 
and orgemized criminals, and as a Russian journalist noted, 
provided great incentives - - personal profits, which a 
portion of are used to thwart any official investigations*® 
that may arise through the payment of bribes and, further, 
are used to keep feeding the fires of conflict.
Since many of the CIS states possessed valueüale natural 
resources, plus strategic worth (they shared borders with 
the Russiam Federation), one could not expect Russian 
foreign intelligence to just leave their control to the 
indigenous peoples. Like the old Soviet KGB's informant 
networks in post-communist East Europe, its networks 
remained intact in the Russian republics also. This fact 
can be partially attributed to the KGB's maintenance of its 
voluminous files.*'* As Amy Knight noted, this perpetuating 
situation makes it likely that the SVR is currently the main 
intelligence-gatherer in the CIS states,*^ especially since 
the remnants of the former Soviet republic KGBs do not have 
the skills or capability for this task. Rather, Russian 
integration with these states is a Moscow foreign policy 
priority, as Yeltsin indicated in 1994, and Kremlin 
officials have repeatedly stated since then. Further, Amy 
Knight notes that Yeltsin tasked the SVR "to acquire 
'preemptive information' on the plans and intentions of the 
West toward the other CIS states and also tasked the service
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to 'systematically monitor' the situation along Russia's 
borders. "*®
According to Amy Knight, the SVR's role in the "near 
abroad" has been to provide Yeltsin's government with 
intelligence on the political situation there. Surely, 
since many of the republics contain a wealth of natural 
resources, the SVR also gathers economic intelligence. 
Indeed, Russia zealously seeks to maintain its hold on 
future access to republic resources even while the 
development of their resources and, in turn, economies could 
benefit greatly by the use of U.S. technology, which is a 
necessity for their realization of the massive wealth they 
contain and which Moscow cannot currently provide. For 
example, instead of republic interests sharing the resources 
with Western oil firms in exchemge for technical and 
drilling expertise, rather, the "new oligarchy" employs the 
SVR to work to help Russian businessmen to steal it.
(Russian officials constantly attempt to maintain or to take 
control over republic resources, which they tend to believe 
are theirs).
As Karen Dawisha observed, Yeltsin's foreign policy 
emphasizes that "the sphere of Russia's economic, political, 
and humanitarian interests extends to the entire post-Soviet 
space"*® and, moreover, hovers in its neo-imperialist stance 
over these states, in an attempt to stake its claim as the 
"protector of their national security interests."
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Certainly, there is a great amount of SVR-FSB 
collaboration in the "near abroad." The SVR extends its 
influence through its relationships with the FSB, which 
maintains a close relationship with the new republics' 
security and intelligence organizations. As Amy Knight 
noted, between 1992-94, intelligence cooperation agreements 
were signed between Russia and all of the CIS states.**
These agreements serve as the overt and official basis for 
chekist (domestic and foreign intelligence) collaboration.
Indeed, Russian political leaders' recent and ongoing 
displays of paremoia of Americem influence on Russia's or 
the former Soviet republics' policies is reminiscent of 
Stalin's psychopathic concern about U.S. influence and the 
spread of capitalist democracy into the Soviet Union.
As memy Americam scholars suggest, Russia's current 
foreign policy in the "near abroad" is the reassertion of 
imperial control, which would only serve to undermine the 
democratic process that has begun there. Obviously, Moscow 
aims to accomplish this objective through "reintegration", 
whether voluntary or by force, (when possible), as the 
Russian military's recent bombardment of Chechnya 
demonstrated. Indeed, it has been suggested that one of the 
Kremlin's main purposes in attacking Chechnya was to prepare 
the building of a pipeline through the city of Grozny.
Moreover, the SVR, in collaboration with the FSK, is 
currently fomenting conflicts in other former Soviet
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republics in an effort to maintain their political 
instability and, hence, their dependency on Russia for 
security, in stark contrast to Moscow's claim that it seeks 
an end to the ethnic hostilities and, rather, political 
steibility throughout the region, as implied in its new 
military doctrine.®®®
The case of Azerbaijan provides a clear exemple of 
Kremlin thinking toward the "near eüsroad," particularly in 
regard to those republics that possess significant amounts 
of natural resources. Not surprisingly, Azerbaijani 
President Gaidar Aliyev has been the target of four coup 
attempts, each believed to have been supported by Moscow. ®® 
In another exemple of Russian intervention in 
Azerbaijan, Moscow has exploited the ethnic conflict between 
Azerbaijan and the republic's Armenian enclave, Nagorno- 
Karabakh, in an effort to induce Aliyev to cooperate in 
favor of Russian "new oligarchy" oil interests, rather than 
with established Western oil firms,®®® which have an interest 
in forming JVs and consortiums with the Aliyev government to 
develop Azerbaijan's oil. As Jim MacDougall points out, it 
is in Moscow's interest to continue the Nagomo-Karbakh 
conflict since it improves and secures its potential control 
over the flow of future Caspian oil (by forcing any oil 
pipeline north, through Chechyna).
The contemporary Central Eurasian political landscape 
is one where the oil-rich Caspian Sea region encompasses the
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strategic space between Russia amd Iran. Surely, both SVR 
and Iranian intelligence officers are vigilantly monitoring 
and attempting to influence events in this highly-volatile, 
but resource-rich territory. Energy resources in the 
Caspian Sea region alone have been estimated to contain up 
to 200 billion barrels of oil and natural gas.®°^
Particularly since Azerbaijan gained independence from 
Moscow, Aliyev has welcomed Western investment. Hence, to 
thwart warmer relations between the Azerbaijan government 
and Western oil firms, Russia has illegally provided more 
than $1 billion in arms to neighboring rival Armenia, 
allowing it to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan in its 
efforts to undermine U.S.-Azerbaijani economic goals. 
Furthermore, Russia has provided Iran with nuclear-related 
technologies, missile components, and other advanced 
equipment, presumedaly for exchange of cooperation in 
thwarting U.S. oil investment there. A joint statement was 
issued by Russia and Iran in June 1996 stating that, "Iran 
and Russia should cooperate with regional states to prevent 
the presence of [United States] power in the Caspian Sea."®°® 
The warmer relations between Russia and Iran are not 
only political and economic. The Russian intelligence 
services have also developed a paramilitary link with 
Iran.®°® The SVR is back in the business of training 
terrorists as evidenced by the fact that in early 1995, SVR- 
chief Primakov met in February, and again in July, with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
Iremian intelligence chief Ali Fallahian. These meetings 
culminated in the signing of an accord on cooperation, in 
addition to the closing of orders for eavesdropping and 
transmission equipment, the stationing of Russian experts in 
Iran, and the SVR's creation of a regional hub in Teheran 
that covers Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Oman, and the 
UAE. Reportedly, the Iranian government wemted Primakov to 
aid in improving Iranian security and intelligence 
services,®®® a task Russian intelligence was only too eager 
to fulfill. According to Egyptian intelligence, a 
delegation of around 250 Iremian security officials returned 
from a 7-month long SVR training visit to Moscow on 
September 10, 1995.®®®
In observing the recent Primakov-Fallahian exchanges, a 
senior Pentagon official aptly noted that "Directors of 
intelligence don't meet with each other without agreements 
on exchanging information." Further, he stated that, 
"Primakov has an interest in more than just selling nuclear 
reactors and guns to Iran. His ties are also part of a new 
strategic relationship that gives Russia an entry to 
[Persian] Gulf politics."®®* Furthermore, as Weinberger and 
Schweizer insightfully noted, "If Russia and Iran succeed in 
their designs on the Caspian, they will have potential 
leverage over Western economies, which will be left to rely 
on the unsteüole Persian Gulf region for oil."®®®
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And, in fact, Russia continues to work toward warmer 
relations with those Middle Eastern countries that have 
historically been antagonistic to democratic and Western 
ideals, mainly by providing favorable arms deals. The 
Russieui relationship with these states is not limited to 
arms deals, however; Moscow also seeks to gain influence emd 
expand its markets in the Middle East through the oil and 
gas business. Toward this end, and in flagrant disregard 
for the international sanctions against Iraq, in March 1997, 
Russia signed a $10 billion oil deal with the Iraqi 
government.®®® Nevertheless, the main thrust of Moscow's 
aims in the Middle East remain within the weapons sector.
Throughout the cold war, Soviet policy in the Middle 
East had been to support rogue states such as Libya, Iraq, 
and Iran. Primeücov's prior service and agenda as KGB FCD 
head, later SVR chief, and currently Russian Foreign 
Minister has proven predisposed to arming and supplying 
terrorists in those seme regions. In 1990, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Victor Posuvaluk stated that, consistent with 
recent Soviet history, Russia intended "to pursue an 
increasingly active policy" in the Middle East. He asserted 
that "Russia will keep up contacts with those who are 
regarded as outcasts." Moreover, he claimed that "it would 
be a misteüce to withdraw from the Middle Eastern arms 
market. "®®®
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When Yeltsin appointed Primakov to the post of Foreign 
Minister (FM) in January 1996, and appointed SVR first 
deputy Col. Gen. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, also an 
"Orientalist," as SVR-chief (Aleksei Scherbedcov became 
Trubnikov ' s replacement), ®®® a continuation of Primakov ' s 
(with Yeltsin's support) initiatives in the Middle East was 
assured.®®^
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
The problem the international community faces is that 
it has become very difficult to distinguish SVR officers emd 
organized criminals from Russian businessmen. Since the 
"new oligarchy" controls Russian business, intelligence is 
gathered for both the state emd private business. Hence, 
the Russian intelligence services are collecting information 
that fits the agenda of those very same people who are 
responsible for the massive theft of Russia's resources and 
the billions of dollars worth of capital flight.
A question that must be asked is how long can the 
Russian state withstand the unproductive exploitation of 
resources that contributes nothing to the economy itself? 
Currently, members of the "new oligarchy" control a majority 
of Russia's commercial enterprises and virtually all the 
major industries. Because the top industrialists use their 
political connections to gain tax and export exemptions^ and 
therefore do not pay taxes, coupled with the government's 
failure or ineüaility to gain revenues because of a tax 
collection system within which corrupt personnel accept
170
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bribes to subsidize their minuscule incomes rather than 
attempt to collect taxes, the Russian tax base has become 
exceedingly narrow. Consequently, millions of Russian 
soldiers and pensioners have not been paid for months. This 
situation could lead to great unrest and instability, and, 
hence, poses a threat to states outside Russia's borders.
In 1995, Yegor Gaidar argued that the greatest danger 
to Russia's economy was the integration of private business 
and government.^ And, as Moscow News' columnist Vladimir 
Gurevich explains, this is the situation describing the 
relationships that have become the trend in Russia today.^
By 1996, criminal groups and commercial enterprises had 
become completely integrated. Victor Loshak, Moscow News' 
editor-in-chief, made this point in May 1996 when he stated 
that, "Today the success of Russian business is said to have 
a lot to do with its proximity to the Kremlin. Further 
clarification is provided by the statement of Boris 
Berezovsky that, "it would be absolutely hypocritical to 
maintain that business is developing strictly according to 
laws declared by the state ... everyone who is successful in 
business today, without exception, has some sort of 
relationship with concrete individuals at the top.
Again, how long can the Russian economy and state 
withstand this trend? Because OC controls many Russian 
banks, the country is becoming a preferred location for 
money-launderers, who can easily move bulk money across the
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Russian border by simply paying bribes to Border Troops and 
then concealing the cash within packaged goods emd vehicles, 
employing the same methods used to smuggle people, stolen 
cars, drugs, and other illegal goods across state borders. 
Even terrorists such as the ones who bombed a Moscow city 
bus in October 1995 succeeded in bribing their way across 
the border.^ Others have labeled the paying of bribes to 
border guards and customs officials "routine."’ In fact, 
the corruption is so deep-rooted that many security 
officials conspire to make it difficult for the consumer to 
get a visa, make a telephone call, or get a car (which may 
be loaded with all sorts of contreüsand) , across the border 
without first paying a hefty bribe.®
At a July 1996 conference on "The Shadow Economy: Its 
Economic, Social and Legal Aspects" held in Moscow, deputy 
chief of the FSB's Economic Counterintelligence Department, 
Vladimir Sergeyev, pointed out that whole regions of Russia 
are totally controlled by OC and that close to 70% of 
'dirty' money equal to about 50 trillion rubles a year is 
currently being laundered through illegal commercial 
structures. ®
The problem of money laundering exists not only in 
Russia but also throughout the Russian republics where an 
even greater deterioration of life and economy are 
accompanied, and further, compounded by the workings of 
notoriously corrupt law enforcement agencies. The lack of
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government funds contributes directly to this situation.
For example, Kazakhstani KGB Chairman Jenisbek Jumanbekov 
stated in early 1996 that the country faced a serious 
problem of forged bank documents, illegal exporting, and 
money-laundering. He asserted that literally billions of 
dollars worth of false bank guarantees had been confiscated 
in 1995 alone. The problem is not confined to individuals 
of the FSU. Gangsters around the world exploit the Russian 
banking situation. For exemple, Jumanbekov also had 
discovered that members of the new Nigerian government had 
aimed to transfer $30-40 million dollars into Kazeüchstani 
bank accounts.’®
In 1994, Russian specialist Louise Shelley observed 
that, "domination by the Communist Party may be replaced by 
the controls of OC."” And, indeed, that is exactly what 
has happened: a banking oligarchy consisting of OC elements 
has become a dominant power structure in post-Soviet Russia. 
The threat OC poses to the international business community 
is real, and it is growing. Many Russian banks have been 
working to become reliable and stable enough to enter U.S. 
financial markets, a move which would enable foreign 
companies to trade on the Russian stock market.” Already, 
the American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
enforced action against a Russian investment fund that was 
charged with making an illegal public offering of securities 
by advertisements published in the New York Times.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
The spread of Russ lam OC has no boundaries. And where 
there is Russian OC, there are Russian intelligence 
operatives. Any state's economy may be targeted, as 
evidenced by the fact that by the mid-1990s, reports had 
surfaced of Russian dummy bank operations in foreign 
countries. In 1996, for example, Spanish intelligence 
(CESID) officials alleged that the Russian mafia, through 
Russian dummy banks, was laundering money in the Spanish 
tourist industry and also real estate. Further, they 
alleged that the Russians were "rushing" to teüce over 
Spanish private banks in order to launder mafia money 
through them and, ultimately, to gain control of Spain's 
finances.”
In another exemple, a report indicated that Russians 
were "buying up companies" and purchasing controlling 
interests in many local firms and industries in Cyprus. In 
addition, the report stated that Russian intelligence was 
building up an infrastructure there as a control base for 
its Middle East operations.’^
Corruption at the highest levels of the Russian 
government has exacerbated the economic problems that the 
Kremlin faces, particularly in light of its lack of 
revenues. Moreover, the continued flight of state capital 
by corrupt officials has plagued the reform process. For 
exemple, the 1995 boom in Russian-Spanish business in the 
tourism and real estate sectors can in part be attributed to
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Russia's lack of laws on the acquisition of foreign real 
estate. Indeed, the nonexistence of any esteüslished tax 
rate in this sphere could even be perceived as a 
"legalization of capital flight." The process involved was 
one in which real estate acquisitions were accomplished in 
the name of foreign companies with overseas accounts that 
were opened without Russia's Central Bank's permission; 
thus, the result was that when Russians (typically members 
of the "new oligarchy") purchased foreign real estate, 
usually with laundered money, there was no contribution to 
the state budget and the Russian government had no recourse 
to recover either the stolen money or taxes on its use.’®
The Kremlin justifies the activities of the KGB's 
successors on the grounds of "national security." A more 
accurate description would be "personal and political 
security"; as part of the "new oligarchy's" search for 
profits and private gain, the Russiem security and 
intelligence services use their JVs with foreign partners 
and firms throughout the world as the cover for their 
espionage and recruitment activities. This is the essential 
role of the chekists in the contemporary world - - to enrich 
themselves emd their comrades through espionage and the 
control of Russian business.
Moreover, OC plays a major role here, as Professor 
Yakov Kostyakovsky, a researcher at the St. Petersburg 
branch of the Sociology Institute has pointed out; that is.
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entrepreneurship in Russia today originated as OC activity; 
specifically, when "thieves-in-law" were invited to manage 
banks.” The trend is continuing. Because of the lack of 
clear tax legislation, the Federal Tax Police's corruption, 
emd the government's levying of exorbitant taxes on emy 
honest firms that may exist, the state's economy and the 
Russiem standard of living suffer tremendously. And those 
tax police who do try to do their job, face tremendous 
obstacles. In a vivid example of the problems associated 
with tenc collecting, in 1996, 26 Russian tax collectors were 
killed and 74 were injured in the course of their work, six 
were kidnapped, and 41 had their homes burned down.”
To illustrate the extreme range of corruption, a Tax 
Police report noted that massive amounts of taxpayer funds 
had been passed through banks known to be insolvent. The 
report suggested that to prevent this from occurring and to 
persuade companies to make tax payments through bona fide 
banks would require tax obligations to only be considered 
fulfilled when the tax payment was entered into the budget 
account at the proper tax inspectorate.’® The problem was 
that it was the officials of government-owned businesses, 
not the officials of honest businesses (many of these have 
simply been taxed out of existence), who were cheating the 
government.
As Russia's financial situation continued to spiral out 
of control, the West continued to send assistance. Within
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
the foreign intelligence sphere, Moscow aimed to avoid the 
foreign policy implications that would accompany the making 
of illegal arms transfers, which tended to draw the chagrin 
of America, "The Great Financier," and, consecpiently, 
constituted risking a loss in U.S. government-backed loans 
or International Monetary Fund and World Bank monies. These 
monies were meant to be used as leverage to coerce the 
Russian government to keep the scale of corruption within 
certain limits. However, as J. Michael Waller pointed out 
in a 1996 article concerning American aid to Moscow, 
paradoxically, U.S. dollars have only discouraged reforms 
and Eibetted OC and official corruption.^®
Any domestic opposition to Kremlin policy continues to 
be perceived, posited, and condemned by the Russian security 
and intelligence services, and the masters they serve, as 
subversive conspiracies engineered and designed by the 
West.^’ Indeed, the Russian propaganda machine continues to 
be very powerful emd influential and remains in force, 
contrary to Moscow's claim of its demise. The KGB's 
successors' efforts to affect and alter world opinion to 
perceive the Russian intelligence services as "reformed," 
with legal controls, continue on a grand scale. The 
chekists' role in the Kremlin's public relations, as J. 
Michael Waller closely examined in his 1994 book on the 
KGB,” remains prominent. So long as Moscow continues to 
accuse the West as being the source of Russia's problems.
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labeling any Western assistemce as "subversive," and fails 
to stifle corruption, make and enforce laws, emd improve its 
situation from within, the country will only worsen its 
present state of affairs, particularly within the economic 
realm.
In a June 1996 report to the Moscow State Institution 
of International Relations outlining Russian foreign policy, 
Primakov stressed the need for an active foreign policy. He 
must have had the SVR in mind when he stated that external 
factors must be actively created for dealing with the 
domestic situation, particularly the economy.^® Cries for 
aid to help the "poor Russian people” are laughéüale when it 
is only the ruthless new oligarchy that reaps the benefits 
of foreign economic aid. Indeed, his statement is a call 
for technological, industrial, and economic espionage 
assistance and intelligence. Thus, Primakov inferred that 
the SVR, (which Primakov strongly influences since the 
Russian foreign intelligence service is currently headed by 
his former SVR first deputy, Trubnikov), was conducting its 
economic espionage offensive as an attempt to heal the 
Russian economy. That idea is ludicrous. In reality, the 
information gained through Russian espionage, again, has 
only aided "new oligarchy" businesses, and certainly has not 
been used to any benefit to the Russian populace, and 
particularly the peoples of the former Soviet republics, 
whose societies and resources Moscow continues to exert
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great influence over. Moreover, the point was somehow 
missed that enforcing codified and unambiguous laws, 
applicable to all, would be the first step in healing the 
Russian economy.
In order to strengthen Russia's international position, 
Primakov stressed the need to coordinate its foreign policy­
making bodies because, he stated, the situation where each 
ministry has its own foreign policy must end. Further, he 
called for Russiem ambassadors in foreign lands to take 
responsibility to coordinate the activities of all active 
Russian agencies within their respective countries.
Hence, Primeücov's emphasis on forging some "coordination" 
among Russian security and intelligence services 
demonstrated a planned effort to streamline chekist 
organizations, goals, and interests, to the new oligarchy's 
benefit.
It is evident that the world is presently being 
confronted by a new and forceful espionage offensive 
orchestrated by Moscow and currently being carried out by 
the products of the former KGB, Russia's corrupt political 
leadership, and powerful, organized criminals who now have 
well-developed international networks with which to ply 
their criminal trade. These networks currently have the 
capêibility to channel anything from stolen shoes to nuclear 
weapon components.
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The international community must work to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons, as instability in a nuclear-armed 
state constitutes a global threat, particularly when that 
state is controlled by organized crime. This will prove a 
difficult task in the face of the vast differences in 
current American and Russian perceptions. Former Russian 
National Security Advisor Aleksandr Lebed exemplified the 
point when he responded to ABC News' Ted Koppel's question 
regarding US-Russian relations vis-a-vis the safekeeping of 
nuclear weapons. Koppel asked, "Should we worry?" Lebed 
stated, "We are all products of the cold war. And so the 
chekist legacy continues.
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